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SYNOPSIS.
This dissertation sets out to examine the inter-relationships 
which exist betweeen housing policies, at both the national and the 
local level, planning policies and the house construction industry.
The rationale behind this examination being that a full understanding 
of the nature and operations of the house construction industry, the 
housing market and the way in which policy initiatives affect them is 
essential if policies are to achieve their objectives and if, in the 
process, the best use is to be made of resources so commited.
Chapter One examines the nature of the house construction 
industry, and in particular the size and type of firms, the inputs to 
the construction process, the importance of the level of productivity 
in the industry, and the inter-relations between house construction 
and other forms of construction. Ihe industry is shown to be highly 
fragmented, being dominated by small firms, often dependent upon 
larger firms for their work. This, together with the complex operation 
of assembling the many inputs required, makes the process of construction 
long, difficult and often inefficient. The implication of this for 
policy makers is that policies designed to affect the level of pro­
ductive activity may in the event create bottlenecks in the supply of 
inputs to the industry leading to demand outstripping supply with 
inflationary consequences. The chapter consequently concludes that 
a consideration of the capacity of the industry and its organisation 
is essential for efficient and effective policy making.
Chapter Two goes on to examine the market in which the house 
construction industry must operate and which policy-makers attempt to
manipulate. It is recognised that in the long-run demand is derived 
from the demographic structure of the population and the levels of 
real income, but that in the short-run it is that demand made effective 
through the provision of house purchase finance or via local authority 
investment which is the important consideration. In the long-run it 
is demand which is seen as the main determinant of the cost and supply 
of land, materials and manpower, but it is recognised that short-run 
changes in the level of demand, even small changes, might have an 
inflationary effect since market imperfections make the response of 
the construction industry somewhat ’sticky'.
Chapter Three identifies four rationales for public inter­
vention in the housing markets of advanced capitalist societies. The 
first, 'housing policy as social policy' holds that the market cannot 
or will not provide housing at a high enough standard and in sufficient 
quantities on its own. Consequently public policy is employed to 
distort the market mechanism to produce the desired housing stock.
This view is directly opposed to the second rationale 'housing policy 
as a lubricant to the market mechanism*. It holds that the market is 
the most efficient and reliable way of distributing housing resources 
and that the function of policy should be to make the market mechanism 
more effective. The two other rationales view housing policy as 
secondary and subserviant to the more important policies of macro- 
economic management and the potent forces of class-struggle. Both 
may be envisaged as consistent with the first two rationales, although 
both are dependent upon other events within government and society as 
a whole.
Chapter Pour examines current central and local government 
housing strategies. It highlights the growing subservience of the
satisfaction of housing needs to macro-economic policy. It shows 
that investment in housing is falling in the name of reduced public 
expenditure, but that much of the apparent savings are illusory as 
low income groups must be supported by Supplementary Benefit and rent 
rebates, while the promotion of owner-occupation is encouraging people 
to move into a more heavily subsidised tenure. Local housing strategies 
are shown to be increasingly constrained by central government policy 
which has led to local authority housebuilding falling into a deep 
decline and a concomitant reliance upon a depressed private sector 
to fulfil housing needs. In the process of developing the argument 
the housing finance system is described.
Chapter Five examines the promotion of private housebuilding 
in Glasgow as an example of the way in which local housing and planning 
departments attempt to influence the construction industry in the 
pursuance of policy objectives. The history of this policy, its 
objectives and its performance so far are described and evaluated.
The final chapter draws together the main arguments of the 
preceding five chapters, laying particular emphasis upon the impli­
cations of this discussion for central government housing policy and 
the chosen example of a local policy, the promotion of owner-occupation 
in Glasgow. The main defects and limitations of these policies are 
outlined and possible improvements and reforms are suggested.
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I N T R O D U C T I O N
This dissertation takes as its subject the inter­
relationships which exist between housing policy-makers, planners 
and housebuilders. Important policy decisions are seen to take 
place at the level of both national and local government, the 
latter principally through local authority housing and planning 
departments. The rationale behind this examination is that if 
policy initiatives are to be successful, and if in the process the 
best use is to be made of resources, it is essential that policy­
makers understand the nature and operations of the house construction 
industry and the housing market.
The importance of these inter-relationships has been 
sorely overlooked in the past. The most articulate recent expo­
sition of government housing policies has been contained in the 
Green Papers of 1977 (DoE 1977, Scottish Office 1977) which, while 
discussing other aspects of policy in great depth, barely mention 
the house construction industry at all. Academics too tend to pass 
over this thorny subject, the standard texts (such as Donnison 
1967, Lansley 1979» Merrett 1979» and Murie et al 1976) largely 
treating the industry as ‘given*, some alluding to its 'sluggish* 
response to changes in the level of demand.
It is hoped that here some light might be thrown upon 
this neglected subject, that some of the limitations and pit-falls 
of attempts to influence the industry might be illuminated, and 
that the implications of this for the formulation and implementation 
of housing policies will become apparent.
CHAPTER ONE
THE NATURE OF THE HOUSE CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY.
51. 1.
If the purpose of public policy is to alter the nature and 
operations of its subject, then it is necessary to understand the 
composition of the material it is trying to influence. With respect 
to housing policy, then, the structure of the housebuilding industry 
and its operational practices must be understood if policy objectives 
are to be satisfactorily realised. Certain policies will place 
demands upon certain sizes and types of firm and their respective 
requirements for labour, materials and capital. Thus, it is essen­
tial that firms are capable of the response required and, furthermore, 
are willing to respond in the desired fashion. Unfortunately, many 
policy initiatives pay little regard to this aspect, (the Green 
Paper on Housing Policy, for example, hardly mentions the industry - 
DoE 1977 )* and must, therefore, be based more on wishful thinking 
and guesswork, than thorough analysis. This chapter, then, examines 
the basic raw material of the housebuilding industry attempting, 
at one and the same time, to be descriptive while keeping an eye 
on the potentials of the industry's responsiveness.
Any attempt to discuss the 'house construction' industry 
runs up against an immediate problem of demarcation, for such an 
industry, per se, does not exist. Housebuilding is an activity 
carried out within the context of the construction industry as a 
whole, and many firms engage in other forms of construction activity 
and in activities outside the field of construction altogether.
The spread of firms, for example, ranges from the large multi­
national and national companies, who may be involved in large civil 
engineering projects, down to small firms which engage in repair and 
maintainance work. The consequence of this merging of housebuilding 
activity into other fields, is that much of the discussion arid
6statistical information in this chapter must he conducted at the 
level of the construction industry as a whole, while information 
specific to house construction may have to he tentatively inferred 
from these sources. The description which follows, therefore, is 
not as full, up to date and accurate as the author would wish, hut 
it is felt that a sufficiently clear picture can he drawn to place 
subsequent chapters in their correct context.
1. 2. FIRM SIZE
The construction industry is numerically dominated hy very 
small firms with extremely low levels of capitalisation. This 
situation is partially determined hy the nature of the activity.
Much of the work consists of very small projects which provide little 
scope for technical or managerial economies of scale. Secondly, 
construction is an industry which is hi^ily constrained geographically. 
A great deal of the construction process, particularly in house­
building, consists of a complex on-site assembly process, most of 
the components being very bulky and uneconomic to transport. 
Consequently, most firms, with the exception of those engaged in 
very large civil engineering projects, are constrained to regional 
operation. The smallest firms would find it difficult to operate 
beyond a fifty mile radius. Finally, it is very easy to enter the 
industry, since very little capital or qualifications are required, 
and materials may be obtained on credit from builders' merchants.
It might be noted that the rate of failure in the industry is high 
and this may, in part, reflect this ease of entry. In I97I» small 
firms of 25 operatives or less, accounted for about 90% of the total 
number of construction firms and 27% of new house construction, 
(Balchin and Kieve, 1977)*
The high number of small firms is not reflected by output 
and employment, as Table 1.1 illustrates, which seems to indicate 
a concentration of activity in a small number of large firms. 
Although large firms in construction have not reached the dominant 
position enjoyed by large manufacturing firms, the trend does appear 
to be towards concentration. Fragmentation appears to be more 
prevalent in housebuilding, the largest English housebuilder con­
tracting only 6% of the total new housing, (Balchin and Kieve 1977» 
Dunleavy 1981).
Table 1.1 The Structure Of The Construction Industry 1935-68.
No. of Employees % of Firms % of Gross Output % of Employment
1935 1954 1968 1935 195^ 1968 1935 1954 1968
<100 99 98 98 60 44 3 6 67 53 41
100 - 500 1 2 2 24 25 25 22 23 25
> 500 15 31 39 11 23 35
Total 100 100 100 99 100 100 100 99 101
(Source : Dunleavy, 1981)
This low level of concentration, especially when compared 
with manufacturing industry, has led neo-classical, economists to 
view the industry as highly competitive and to have, consequently, 
employed models of a competitive market, immediately adjusting to 
market conditions with perfect information. This interpretation 
is highly deceptive, however, and is not bourne out by more detailed 
examination. As has already been pointed out, most construction 
firms are regionally, not nationally, based. Consequently, the 
correct geographical level at which to examine competitiveness is
the local. Indeed many of the large companies, such as Barratt 
and Wimpey, operate through a series of regionally based, and largely 
autonomous companies, linked to the parent. Secondly, this ignores 
the fact that a great many companies are sub-contractor's.
Sub-contracting operates on the basis that the main con­
tractor engages other firms to perform certain specific tasks in 
the construction process. This may allow small firms to specialise 
in a particular part of the construction process, and so support 
specialised labour and equipment which may be transferred from 
project to project as demand dictates, so maintaining continuous 
employment. Labour-only sub-contracting, known as ’the lump', is 
also prevalent. Under this form of organisation, individuals or 
gangs of labourers are engaged to perform specific tasks in return 
for a lump sum. Sub-contracting has obvious advantages for the main 
contractor, who does not have to support a specialised workforce, 
and is able to shed unwanted labour easily. The lump carries 
additional advantages, since National Insurance can be avoided. Thus, 
the industry is much less fragmented than the statistics suggest, 
many sub-contractors being fundamentally dependent upon larger 
companies for work. The actual degree of concentration is somewhat 
difficult to calculate, however.
1. 3. FIRM TYPE
There are essentially three types of house building firmsj 
speculators, private contractors, and Direct Labour Organisations, 
(D.L.O.'s). Each will be discussed in turn, and their contribution 
to the industry considered.
1. 3.1. Speculators - Discussions of private housing speculators 
tend to arouse a degree of passion, and arguments tend to be conducted
at an ideological level. One lobby has argued that it is undesirable 
even immoral that profits should be made from a good which is so 
socially essential, (The Community Development Project, 1977)t and 
that in his quest for profits the builder and landowner make housing 
unnecessarily expensive. At the other extreme, usually forwarded 
by the housebuilding lobby, the developer seems to be raised to a 
philanthropic status, who essentially buys what the customer wants. 
Thus, Jenkins (1977 P«52), in a book commissioned by Taylor Woodrow
writes :
*A speculative builder today is a man who studies the 
market, finds out what kind of houses people really 
want, tries to give the buyers something his competitors 
haven't thought of, and then designs and builds houses 
with as much individuality as possible in the pleasantest 
possible surroundings at realistic prices.'
But, beneath the ideology is a more complex pattern, which requires 
elaboration.
Speculative builders are not a homogenous group, the main 
division being between regionally based, small to medium-sized firms 
and the large national, and multi-national firms, generally described 
as the 'volume builders'.
The small to medium-sized regional builders are generally, 
family concerns, or have only recently ceased to be such. The very 
small firms tend to concentrate on acquiring small plots of land 
close to well established, and generally up-market, owner-occupied 
areas, and develop a small number of houses for the upper end of the 
market, (which carries fewer risks). These builders are not par­
ticularly concerned with growth, being content to construct a few 
houses a year and take a reasonable profit. Their small output
requires only a small land bank, and consequently, they incur low 
capital costs. They may also build houses to commission (Harloe 
et al 1974).
The medium sized speculator generally began as a small firm 
and has subsequently grown, perhaps taking over other firms, to take 
a sizeable share of the regional market with a relatively high out­
put. Often, such firms have very large land banks, much of it with 
planning permission, which they may hold onto for a number of years 
in order to maintain an adequate input of land to the production 
process and in order to speculate on the land itself, either 
through sales to other builders, or through the final cost of the 
completed house some years later. Large land banks may also be a 
way for firms to maintain their market position, as local authorities 
will be reluctant to release more land than they feel is necessary 
for housing development. This means that other firms will find 
difficulty in entering the regional market, (Cameron 1981).
The volume builders have a very different modus operandi.
They tend to be large, national and multi-national firms, which
have often grown out of family concerns. Many still carry the original
family names and still have familial connections, (Barratts, Leech,
Taylor-Woodrow, McAlpine, Costain, Wates and Wimpey, for example).
Many of these firms are also contractors and civil engineers and
perform other activities outside the construction sphere. They
are almost all public companies and want to achieve a high rate of
turnover to satisfy their shareholders. Their operations have more
in common with production-line techniques, since they constantly
need to acquire land, build, sell and move quickly on to new sites, 
a high rate of turnover being essential to their survival. Their
sites have generally been located on the periphery of the large 
conurbations, since land is cheaper and more easily acquired and 
built on than in city centre locations. Their lust for land has often 
brought them into conflict with the medium-sized builders with large 
land banks, and they have often bought out such companies, simply 
to acquire land. The volume builders build for all levels of the 
market, but tend to concentrate on the lower end, especially on 
first-time buyers, as it is here that there is the greatest potential 
for market expansion. (Community Development Project, 1977> Cameron 
1931).
1. 3.2. Contractors - Contractors tend to be private construction 
companies, who compete for large scale housing schemes, usually for 
council housing. They tend to be very large construction companies 
and often engage in speculative volume building as well. Companies 
such as VJimpey, Taylor-VJoodrow, McAlpine and Costain, are well known 
in both fields. Smaller contractors may build a small number of 
houses for local authorities, but since the 1950*s there has been 
a growth of large-scale schemes, especially during the high-rise 
boom, and a concomitant growth of large contractors, (Dunleavy, 1981).
To obtain work from local authorities, contractors must 
take part in the tendering system. There are four main types of 
local authority tender :
i) Open tendering - is open to any company who wishes to make a 
bid on the basis of a project designed or commissioned by the 
local authority and costed by their quantity surveyor. The 
usual practice is for the lowest tender to be accepted. This 
type of tender has become increasingly uncommon, and has been 
criticised by a number of government reports, and discouraged
by central government. The most recent critical report was 
the Wood Report, (NED0,1975)» 'The Public Client and the 
Construction Industry'. The main criticisms are that open 
competition is wasteful, since a large number of firms will 
produce schemes, but only one will be accepted. Secondly, the 
contractor who prepares the lowest cost tender may not be the 
one to produce the best quality work.
Selective tendering - is supposed to overcome problems of the 
quality of workmanship, by limiting competition to a small 
number of firms whom the local authority knows are capable of 
completing the work to a competent standard. The problem with 
this method is that the smaller the number of firms involved, 
the greater the liklihood of collusion to achieve price rigging. 
Corruption scandals, such as those associated with Poulson have 
illustrated these and other dangers. Some local authorities 
now have as much as 40% of their work undertaken by one firm, 
(Direct Labour Collective 1978» Merrett 1979) •
Registered tendering - involves the local authority approaching 
a single contractor. The architect and building firm then have 
detailed discussions on the type and scope of the work, and its 
financial implications. The contractor will eventually negotiate 
the final contract with the client. There has been criticism 
that this form of tendering reduces the scope of public 
accountability because of the closed nature of the negotiations, 
(Merrett, 1979)• While the Wood Report pointed out that E.E.C. 
Regulations require that public sector projects costing over 
one million units of account, should be open to competition 
from firms of all member states, thus limiting the scope for this 
type of contract, (NEDO, 1975).
iv) Package Deals - In this type of contract design and construction 
are united in a single firm. This is particularly prevalent 
in systems building projects, where the system is probably copy­
righted by one company. This type of contract was most common 
during the high-rise period. (Merrett, 1979» Dunleavy, 1981).
Work carried out by the contractor is usually paid for by the 
local authority, stage by stage, normally on a monthly basis. Some 
are paid in a lump sum on completion of the project, but this is 
only usual with the smaller projects. The total value of work is 
determined by the client's quantity surveyor and is set down in an 
'interim certificate', on the basis of which the contractor may demand 
payment. This system of periodic payment means that the amount of 
capital that a builder has to advance is very much less than it would 
have been if payment was made on the project's completion. Because 
of the nature of evaluating the work, it is possible for the contractor 
to 'work the contract', so that it appears that the earliest sections 
of the production process are most expensive. This, in effect, means 
that the local authority is paying a cash advance to the developer, 
which can be used to finance the rest of the project. It is estimated 
that after 30% of the project is completed, it becomes self-financing, 
(Burchell and Hill, 1980).
* 1. 3.3 Direct Labour Organisations (DLO's) - DLO's have a long 
history, originally being set up in the Ninenteenth Century to counter­
act price-rigging by contractors. In 1977 only 12 out of 5^9 local 
authorities had no DLO, and a total of 165,580 operatives, were 
employed. These figures are probably much larger than presently 
prevail, as DLO's have been severely affected by the recent cut-backs 
in public expenditure. Most of their work is concerned with the repair
and maintainance of council housing, and their share of new-build 
has been small and declining. (See Table 1.2)
Table 1.2 DLO's Share of New House Construction.
1924 - 10 %
1948 -  8 %
1974 - 5 %
(Source : Direct Labour Collective, 1978).
Since their inception DLO's have been the subject of political 
controversy. Their proponents claim they are publicly accountable, 
efficient, avoid the abuses of the contracting system, and provide 
stable employment for building workers. Their opponents characterise 
DLO's as inefficient, removed from the rigours of the market mechanism 
and posing a threat to local contractors at the expense of the rate­
payer. These allegations have led some DLO's to behave as contractors, 
placing bids for local authority contracts along with private con­
tractors. Most of the work carried out by DLO's is of the traditional 
type, most being too small to support industrialised building methods.
1. 4. INPUTS TO THE HOUSE CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY.
If the industry is to respond to policy initiatives, it must 
have the resources to do so. This section describes the inputs to 
the industry and attempts to make some comment as to their availability. 
The emphasis of this section is not economic, however, this aspect 
being dealt with in Chapter 2. There are four main inputs to the 
production process : finance, land, materials and labour, each of 
which will be discussed in turn.
1. 4.1. Finance - In the private sector over 50% of loans to builders 
come from the clearing banks. This is particularly true of small 
firms, who do not have assets for reinvestment. The loans tend to
be large when compared to builders' assets, and land banking is one 
way of providing collatoral, as well as being an essential part of 
the production process. The flow of funds tends to be unstable, 
builders having to compete in the open market, and their competitive 
position has declined since 1974, (see 1.3). Builders are, therefore, 
highly susceptible to variations in interest rates and availability. 
Loans from the clearing banks will tend to be between 1 to5% 
above the base rate. The smaller and less diverse firms have to 
meet higher interest charges. Smaller firms may also be able to 
obtain funds from the building societies, but this form of finance 
is far less common. (MacLennan,1982 a, NEDO 1975» Harloe et al 1974, 
The Housing Monitoring Team 1980).
Table 1.3 Advances Outstanding Bv Reporting Banks In The U.K. To 
Construction Companies And The Manufacturing Sector 
1972 - 1978 (£M).
Total Lending To Total Lending To (a) as % 
Construction Companies Manufacturing Industry of (b) 
(a) (b)
1972 Mid-Nov. 911 4977 19.5
1973 " 1867 6658 28.0
1974 " 2199 9374 23.4
1975 " 1524 7080 21.5
1976 " " 1548 8550 18.1
1977 Mid-Feb. 1626 8715 18.6
" Mid-May 1622 8671 18.7
" Mid-Aug. 1636 9400 17.4
" Mid-Nov. 1583 9370 16.8
1978 Mid-Feb. 1607 9805 16.4
(Sources s Bank of England Statistical Abstract; Various Bank of
England Quarterly Bulletins. Published in Housing Monitoring 
Team, I98X)).
Larger firms tend to finance their activities through 
retained profits and share capital, and to a lesser extent, through 
pension funds and insurance companies. The volume builders in 
particular, are dependent upon share capital, and this is a major 
incentive for them to maintain a high turnover to satisfy their share­
holders .
In the public sector, finance for construction is heavily 
dependent upon the level of public expenditure in the form of 
government subsidies and prevailing interest rates. For the most part, 
loans are paid off with income from rents. (Merrett, 1979)* When 
borrowing, local authorities must do so at prevailing market rates, 
although a pool rate for the local authority borrowing as a whole, is 
charged and repayment is spread over sixty years, the expected life 
of a house.
1. 4.2. Land - The economic and planning significance of land will 
be discussed in Chapters Two and Four. While acknowledging the inter­
dependence of these factors, it is sufficient here to recognise that 
land is an essential input to the production process. As such, it is 
necessary for builders, not only to have enough land to continue 
present production, but a land bark sufficient for 2§- to 3 years 
production, which is in the process of obtaining planning permission, 
and which can be brought into production if an upswing in demand 
occurs, (Drewett, 1973).
1. 4.3. Materials - Construction is a complex process, which requires 
many materials from both manufacturing industry and extractive 
processes. The total output of the materials industry in 1977 was 
£5,000 M (at current prices - NEDO, 1978) and at its peak in 1973» the 
industry employed 500,000people. Materials account for about 0^% of
the value of all construction work, consequently, the performance 
and capacity of the materials industry is crucial to the building 
industry and housing policy.
Shortages of materials will, obviously, place a constraint 
upon the construction process, which may foil attempts to alter the 
rate of production through policy initiatives. Shortages may occur if 
competition is forthcoming from more profitable, alternative markets. 
On the other hand, if a materials industry is heavily dependent upon 
construction, it will be badly affected during periods of slump. 
Consequently, the NEDO (1978) concluded that the ideal situation for 
construction, is where the industry accounts for half the sector's 
output. Due to the bulky nature of most material, alternative markets 
abroad are largely impracticable, only 17% of materials produced are 
exported, while 27% of those used are imported.
Since the level of demand in the construction industry is 
somewhat volatile, the materials industry must be sustained during 
periods of low demand, if it is to expand production when demand rises 
again. If the materials industry is not supported, this may result in 
factory closures and the cessation of quarrying activities, which will 
make its response to a rise in demand very sluggish, since these will 
take some time to be reopened. The construction industry is also 
vulnerable due to the high levels of concentration in the materials 
industry. In 1948, there were 900 materials firms, but by 1975 there 
were only 200, (Balchin and Kieve, 1977)* In that year, London Brick 
accounted for 95% of Fletton output, housing consuming 75% °f that. 
This high degree of concentration is to be found in all the major 
materials manufacture (see Table 1.4’), which raises questions as to 
the extent to which the industry is able to exploit its position, by 
pushing materials prices up during periods of high demand.
Table 1.4
The Degree Of Concentration In Certain Materials Industries.
Materials Leading Conrpanies % of U.K. Market
Asbestos Turner and Newall 55
Bricks London Brick 45
Cement APCM 63
Rugby 14
Tunnel 13
Ceramic Tiles Johnson Richards 65
Pilkington (Tiling) 14
Concrete Roofing Tiles Maxley 50
Redland 45
Flat Glass Pilkington 100
Plasterboard BPB Industries Ltd. 100
Ready Mixed Concrete Ready Mixed Concrete Ltd. 40
Amey Roadstone 12
Sanitary Ware Armitage Shanks 30
(Glynwed) Ideal Standard 25
Poulton 15
Twyford (Read International.) 15
N.B. All the above named companies axe privately owned.
(Source s Stockbrokers Savory Miln ! Annual Report on the Construction 
Industry. Published in the Direct Labour Collective, 1978)
1. 4.4. Labour - Most on-site operatives (as opposed to professional 
staff) are employed on a casual basis, their term of employment being 
determined by the length of time they are needed to complete their 
particular part of the construction process. Direct labour has 
traditionally enjoyed more security until the recent public expenditure 
cuts. This insecurity has been associated with high levels of 
unemployment among operatives, which has been growing as economic 
conditions have deteriorated. In 1973» there were 90,000 unemployed 
building operatives, by 1978 this had risen to 221,817, at that time 
1 W/o of the U.K. total, (Direct Labour Collective, 1978).
Despite innovations such as the increased use of prefabricated 
components, such as window frames and plasterboard, there is a very 
high percentage of skilled labour, (see Table 1.5)* This high 
dependence has repeatedly created problems during periods of rising 
demand, which have been characterised by labour shortages, and wage 
inflation. This has occurred at every significant rise in demand 
since the Second World War. The problem is made more acute by the 
lack of security in the industry. Those who are able to find more 
secure employment in other industries seldom return. The main form 
of entry into the labour force has been by apprenticeship. But, 
despite labour shortages, the number of apprenticeships has declined 
dramatically from 60,000 in 1964 to 32,000 in 1973, (Cowley, 1979)*
Unskilled labour has been increasingly employed on *the lump', 
(discussed in section 1.2. above). It is difficult to tell how many 
operatives are employed in this way, especially as it is primarily 
used as a method of avoiding Income Tax and National Insurance 
Contributions. It is estimated that the Inland Revenue loses £10 M 
per annum through this practice, (Balchin and Kieve, 1977). Despite
lh,ble 1.5 Skilled Operatives In The House Construction Industry.
Skills Type Private Housing (%) Public Housing (%)
Structure
Bricklaye r 9 • 1 9*0
Roofer 1.1 0.9
Erector - 0.3
Glazier 0.2 0.2
Other 0.2
TOTAL 10.6 10.4
Carpenter 8.3 1*9
Services
Plumber 2.8 2.5
Heating 0.2 0.8
Electrician 1.8 2.5
Others 0.2 0.4
TOTAL 5.0 6.2
Finishers
Plasterer 4.2 3.7
Painter 4 .5 4.6
Floor-Layer 0.5 0.5
Others 0.8 0.4
TOTAL 10.0 9.2
Other
General Labourer 14.5 l6.8
Plaint Operator 2.0 1.1
ScaLffolder 0.8 0.3
Steel Fixer )
Welder ) - 0.3
Pipe / Drain Layer 0.2 0.8
Tarmac / Asphalt 0.2 0.2
Other 0.8 0.4
TOTAL I8 .5 I9.9
General Foreman 
ALL TRADES
3*3 3 .0
55-7 56.6
(Source : NEDO, 1978).
these tax avoidances, unskilled construction workers must be among 
the very lowest paid. The working conditions in the industry are 
also very poor. The work necessarily takes place out of doors and 
construction has probably the worst safety records of all industries.
It is difficult for operatives to press for better conditions, 
security, or pay (except in times of labour shortages), because of 
the low levels of unionisation in the industry. In 1968, 78% of 
businesses with fewer than eight employees had no union members, while 
only 34/6of businesses with over 300 employees had at least 90% member­
ship, (Balchin and Kieve, 1977). This low level of unionisation is 
probably facilitated by the high turnover of operatives, which makes 
unionisation difficult. Low union membership and job security may 
well be advantageous to employers, who are able to employ labour 
flexibly and shed excess labour during periods of low demand. But, 
a high rate of labour turnover may result in low levels of productivity 
from workers unfamiliar with the type of work and firm.
1. 5. PRODUCTIVITY.
When compared to manufacturing industry, improvements in 
productivity in the construction industry have been very slow. 
Mechanisation has affected certain on-site activities, such as earth- 
moving, material-handling and concrete mixing. The amount of work 
on-site has been reduced through off-site pre fabrication of products, 
like window frames and plasterboard. Nonetheless, the majority of 
housing units sire still produced by traditional methods, which have 
not changed significantly since the last century, (Ball,1978).
There have only been two major developments to improve 
productivity. The first is by the reorganisation and integration of
traditional on-site methods. This has been pursued to the greatest 
effect by the volume builders. It involves the acquisition of fairly 
large sites on which a number of houses can be built at the same time. 
This allows the housing starts to be staggered, so that the firms' 
workforce and capital equipment can be fully employed by moving from 
house to house to perform their part of the production process.
Large sites also cut down the necessity to transport materials and 
capital equipment from site to site.
The second innovation is factory, or systems, building and it 
is an attempt to increase productivity by making as much on-site work 
as possible into the assembly of factory made components. The 
method is only economic where the additional factory overheads are 
more than off-set by the higher productive efficiency, and this will 
depend upon a high and stable demand to justify the high initial 
capital input. The savings obtained by factory building are not as 
great as originally envisaged. The component parts of the building, 
must be made to a higher degree of precision than traditional building 
components, such as bricks, so that they will fit together properly 
on-site. Secondly, the savings in skilled labour are not great, since 
traditional skills have tended to be replaced by new ones, such as 
those skilled in the construction of concrete moulds. Lastly, the 
aesthetic, social and maintainance costs of many industrialised 
buildings, particularty high-rise council flats, more than outweigh 
the savings in construction costs. These methods have increasingly 
fallen into disfavour, following the 1965 Ronan Point disaster, 
(Balchin and Kieve 1977, Dunleavy 1981).
Despite these innovations, the performance of the industry 
has been particularly poor. Between 1905 and 1955* productivity in
the industry rose by 0.2$, compared with 2.1$ in manufacturing.
This is reflected in costs, construction costs increasing eight-fold, 
between 1915 and 1965, compared to a five-fold increase in the Retail 
Price Index (RPl), (see Table 1.6). Local authority housing rose by 
33^ relative to the RPI, and owner occupied housing by 42$, (Ball 1978)* 
The performance of the British industry has been disappointing, when 
compared with other countries, such as Sweden. (Duncan, 1978). The 
Wood Report (NEDO 1975)t attributes this poor performance to the 
division of design and construction activity, which makes architects 
unaware of construction difficulties, and unresponsive to increasing 
productivity. Ball (1978) has argued, however, that housebuilders 
have no incentive to increase productivity, as the savings made would 
merely be translated, by the operations of the land market, into 
higher land prices.
Table 1.6 Building Costs, Building Industry Pay, and the General 
Level of Pay and Prices (1970 = 100)
Construction General Price Earnings in Earnings in 
Costs Level Construction Manufacturing
Per Week Per Week
1938 23 23 12 12
1950 52 49 27 27
1955 67 59 40 40
i960 72 67 52 52
19 65 82 80 7° 74
1970 100 100 100 100
1976 258 207 245 235
(Source DoE, 1977).
1. 6. HOUSEBUILDING AND THE CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY IN GENERAL.
As has already been pointed out, the housebuilding industry 
is part of the construction industry as a whole, and very often 
different construction activities take place within the same firm.
This is particularly advantageous to the firm, since the demand for 
different types of construction activity, often do not coincide. 
Consequently, the firm is able to move out of sectors in decline and 
into those that are expanding, thus, achieving higher returns to capital. 
The firm is also able to spread its risks.
Small firms tend to spread their activity into small projects, 
such as repair and maintenance. This kind of activity is attractive 
since there is always a demand and little capital is needed. Small firms, 
small contractors, and some of the larger contractors, have been moving 
increasingly into rehabilitation, in conjunction with policy moves 
away from comprehensive redevelopment since the end of the 1960's. 
(HilLebrandt 1971).
Larger contractors, especially those concerned with major 
civil engineering projects, have moved increasingly into civil 
engineering, as opposed to housing. This trend has also been asso­
ciated with a movement of activity abroad. So fax as housing is 
concerned, these firms had their hey-day in the high-rise period, 
when they could apply their factory-building techniques to council 
housing. Since the decline of high-rise, civil engineering has proved 
to be more profitable.
The movement of activity overseas, has been rapid, and is con­
centrated in a small number of very large firms. In 1970 overseas 
contractsin construction accounted for £311 M, by 1976 this had risen 
to £1,433 M. Gostain now have 75% of their business overseas. 95% of
overseas order's are undertaken by 20 companies, who tend to form 
consortia. The Middle East has proved to be the largest growth area, 
accounting for 46$ of British firms* overseas activities in 1976,
(Direct Labour Collective, 1978)* Some contractors, such as Wimpey, 
Taylor-Woodrow, and McAlpine, have large sections concerned with volume 
building for owner-occupiers. So their concern appears to be more to 
spread risk than to move out of house construction.
The volume builders who have concentrated very much on 
speculative housebuilding in the past, have also begun to diversify. 
Barratts, for example, have moved into the construction of holiday 
homes, notably in Scotland, and into house construction in California. 
While another company, Leech, have diversified into leisure activities, 
such as restaurants, pubs and sports centres, and into shopping centres.
In general, the trend in the construction industry since the 
late sixties has been to move out of housing, and into other fields.
This raises questions as to how far the industry would be able, or 
willing to devote resources to domestic house construction, while 
other activities continue to prove lucrative.
1. 7. CONCLUSIONS.
The house construction industry is, in many ways, highly diverse 
and difficult to delimit. It is very largely inseparable ftom the 
construction industry as a whole, being made up of a multitude of 
firms, of various sizes, engaged in highly diverse activities, in both 
the public and the private sectors. Policy, if it is to be successful, 
must take account of the commercial and resource requirements of the 
industry and the constraints imposed by its structure and input supply. 
Ph.ilure to do so may result, at best in an unresponsive industry, or
at worst, create undesirable bottlenecks in the flow of inputs.
To gain a deeper insight into the ability of policy to influence 
this complex and diverse industry, it is necessary to discuss the 
chararteristics of the housing market, and in particular, its influence 
upon the house construction industry. This is the purpose of Chapter 2.
CHAPTER TWO
THE HOUSING MARKET AND THE HOUSE CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY.
An understanding of the operations of the housing mazfcet is 
essential to any discussion of the influence of public policy on the 
house construction industry. Indeed, it is difficult to conceive of 
any policy which does not have economic ramifications, or relies on 
the operations of the housing market in some way. As has been shown 
in the previous chapter, the vast majority of house construction 
activity is undertaken by private firms, and contractors, who must be 
governed by profit criteria, while construction through public enter­
prise will also require the marshalling of capital and labour. Equally, 
whoever constructs the finatl product, that commodity will affect other 
commodities within the housing market - the quality and costs of 
accomodation in one tenure will exert a profound influence upon other 
housing commodities. While all house construction will consume capital, 
manpower and materials, inputs may be scarce. This high degree of 
inter-dependence of the many and complex elements of the housing 
market, make it essential for policy-makers to have a full under­
standing of the ramifications of their actions, if the desired 
consequences are to obtain. As the Report of the Implementation in 
Planning Working Party of the R.T.P.I. stated :
'If planning objectives and procedures are devised with 
little regard for the realities of the constraints and 
objectives influencing the decisions of the developpers - 
private and public, individual and corporate, large and 
small - then it will fail.'
(R.T.P.I. 1979 p.9)
This chapter, then, attempts to examine the relationship 
between supply and demand within the major tenures, by describing
the operations and complexities of the housing market, and in 
particular, focussing on the suppliers of new housing, the house 
builders.
2. 2. DEMAND.
'The actual demand for housing as expressed in the 
market is very different from housing need... and is 
important because the demand determines the extent to 
which needs will be met through the market and in turn 
the scale of activity in the building industry.’
(Lansley, 1979 p.^7)*
If a need is not met by the market, however, policy may be 
used to translate that need into an effective demand. In any case, 
'need' is a highly subjective concept, which requires precise definition 
to be meaningful, while effective demand has a precise economic 
definition.
Demand is derived from individual households and is dependent 
upon a complex set of criteria as to their preferences for tenure, 
quality, size, and location of the accomodation, and the relation­
ship of these preferences to the household's ability to pay for the 
accomodation. The relationship between demand and supply is, obviously, 
a dynamic one since the more desirable and scarce the property the 
higher will be the price. The behaviour of households is further 
complicated by their imperfect knowledge in the search for accomodation. 
So far as the individual household is concerned then, the demand for 
housing is the product of a complex interaction between preference 
for, and their ability and willingness to pay for, accomodation. It 
is both easier and more usual, however, to discuss demand in aggregate 
terms, and to sub-divide such a discussion into the major tenure types.
In the short-term, it is more useful to discuss demand in 
terms of the main tenures, since demand is made effective in different 
ways in each. In the long-term, however, demand is derived from 
the demographic characteristics of the area in question, and in a 
crude sense, from prevailing population levels. Consequently, the 
demographic statistics of birth, death and migration, are important. 
More important, however, is the number of households, and the rates 
of household formation and dissolution, which will determine future 
trends in housing demand. These figures are notoriously difficult 
to predict.
2. 2.1. Demand in the Owner-Occupied Sector - The demand for houses 
to purchase, comes from newly formed households, existing owner- 
occupiers moving to another house within the tenure, households 
moving into the tenure from other tenures, certain immigrants to an 
area, and the purchase of second homes. The criteria determining the 
choice of owner-occupation above other tenures, are complex, since 
they are often bound up with subjective assessments of status and 
desirability. But, there are important economic criteria in the 
decision-making process, which mediate these preferences. A comparison 
of initial and anticipated mortgage outgoings may well be made 
with current and expected rental levels in other tenures. Thus, house 
prices, credit availability, and credit charges, will be compared 
with local authority and private rents (i.e. the substitution costs 
will be examined). (See Table 2.1). Owner-occupation is not con­
sidered solely as the purchase of housing services, as are the rented 
tenures, it also constitutes the purchase of a building with an 
investment value. This is often a very important element in the 
choice of housing tenure, and must be borne in mind when comparing 
the figures in Table 2.1. (Gough 1975, Whitehead 197*0.
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The cost of buying a house, then, is dependent upon house 
prices and mortgage interest rates, (see Table 2.2). For first-time 
buyers, higher prices would be expected to reduce demand, everything 
else being equal, unless there is a widespread expectation of 
significant rises in house prices in the near future, in which case 
demand may rise initially. For purchasers who already, own a house, 
rising prices pose less of a problem, since the price of the property 
they sell may well have risen at a similar rate to that which they 
are purchasing. Indeed, if a household is trading down, a profit 
may be realised, (Lansley, 1979)*
Table 2.2 Dwelling Prices and Mortgage Interest Rates, U.K.
Average Price of Dwellings With 
Approved Mortgages From 
Building Societies
Building Society
New Dwellings All Dwellings Mortgage Rates {%)
1969 £ 880 - 8.5
1970 £ 5,180 - 8.5
1971 £ 5,970 - 8.0
1972 £ 7,850 - 8.5
1973 £ 10,690 - 11.0
1974 £ 11,340 - 11.0
1975 £ 12,406 £ 12,119 11.0
19 76 £ 13,44-2 £ 12,999 12.25
1977 £ 14-, 768 £ 13,922 9 .5
1978 £ 17.685 £ 16,297 11.75
1979 £ 22,728 £ 21,04? 15.0
(Source : 'Housing and Construction Statistics 1969-79' DoE 1980)
Credit costs and availability are contentious subjects, 
and are of paramount importance in converting latent demand into 
effective demand. Most mortgage finance is supplied by the Building 
Societies, (Table 2.3), and their activities are crucial to the 
operations of the housing market. Local authorities have played a 
decreasing role in the supply of mortgage finance, following cuts 
in public expenditure, although that role is likely to increase again 
significantly, through the financing of the sale of council houses. 
Banks and insurance companies have, traditionally, supplied a very 
small proportion of mortgages, but recently the banks have become 
increasingly competitive with the Building Societies, as investment 
in manufacturing industry becomes more hazardous. Building Societies, 
as the largest lenders, have financed the widest spectrum of housing 
types. They claim their policies tend towards a preference for first­
time buyers, an assertion which has not always been borne out in 
actuality. Local authorities have tended to lend to the lower end 
of the market, especially where Building Societies have 'red lined' 
an area (i.e. identified it as unsuitable for lending). (Boddy 1980). 
Insurance companies and banks have, until recently, financed the upper 
end of the market, but the banks have increasingly moved down-market, 
and are now leding in inner-city areas where Building Society finance 
is hard to come by.
Table 2.3 The Availability of Mortgage Finance
Loans Outstanding 
1975 (£M)
Number of Loans
Granted 1976
Building Societies 
Local Authorities 
Insurance Companies 
Banks
18,882 (77^)
2,738 (11#)
1,520 ( 6%)
1,292 ( 5%)
713,310 (93$)
38,310 ( 5%)
15,3*K> ( 2%)
(Source s The Housing Monitoring Team, 1980)
The recent decline in Building Society loans is associated 
with prevailing economic circumstances. The high level of interest 
rates, in particular, have forced the societies to raise their 
charges to borrowers in order to maintain their competitiveness in 
attracting savers. The significance of Building Society policy to 
the level of house prices was illustrated in the first half of the 
1970's. At this time, an expansion in mortgage lending, coupled with 
high local authority rants, a large increase in real and money income, 
expanding demographic characteristics in the form of high levels of 
household formation, and an unresponsive supply industry, caused 
considerable house and land price inflation, (Mayes, 1979). The low 
levels of lending, since the slump of 1974, have been one of the 
major contributory factors in the subsequent low level of house con­
struction. Under prevailing and expected future government policy 
it is likely that house production will not rise above 150,000 units 
per annum by 1984, due to the low level of mortgage finance available. 
(The Environment Committee 1980, Wilkinson and Archer 1976).
Lastly, it must be pointed out, that local and central govern­
ment exert a highly significant influence upon the level of demand, 
which will be discussed more fully in Chapter Pour.
2. 2.2. Demand in the Public Sector - The demand for council housing 
is not determined by the market pressure exerted by rants, but, as 
the result of an administrative decision made by the local housing 
authority. As in the private sector, effective demand is the product 
of a reconciliation of the kind and number of housing units the 
authority wishes to supply, and what it is able to afford given its 
income from central government, rants and rates, the cost and 
availability of loan finance, and the land acquisition costs it will
have to pay. It is in this way that demand is exerted upon the 
housing land market, and the construction industry.
In the long-run, the demand for local authority housing is 
derived from the local population, in a similar way to the private 
housing market. Demographic characteristics, (especially household 
formation), transfers from other tenures, and the relative costs of 
other tenures, interact to exert a demand which is transmitted to 
the local authority through its council house waiting list. The 
extent to which the local authority wishes, or feels able, to satisfy 
that demand, is set out in its Housing Plan (Scotland), or Housing 
Strategies and Investment Programmes (H.I.P. - England and Wales), 
which forms the basis for its application for finance from central 
government.
To pay their contractors, local authorities must raise loans 
through the private market • These are repayed by a combination of 
council rents, and state subsidies. Each local authority has a 
Consolidated Loan Fund (C.L.F.), which borrows the money needed by all 
council departments. The housing department will then borrow the 
money it needs from the C.L.F., and will be charged a 'pool rate' of 
interest, which represents the rate on all the council's outstanding 
debts. Each year, the housing department will pay a sum of money, 
representing the principal of the loan plus payment of the accrued 
interest, to the C.L.F. Ministerial loan sanction, is attached to any 
capital project, and will specify a maximum period over which the debt 
is to be redeemed. In the case of housing and land, this is sixty 
years. The debt charges, as the payments to the C.LF. are known, 
appear in the Housing Revenue Account (H.R.A.), of each authority. 
(Merrett, 1979).
A further imposition is placed upon local authorities by 
central government, through housing cost yardsticks. These were 
originally used to make sure that new local authority housing met 
a minimum standard of Parker-Morris Accomodation, (Parker-Morris,
1962). But, yardsticks have failed to keep pace with inflation, and 
have increasingly been used as a ceiling on local authority expenditure, 
in the pursuance of macro-economic policy. (Merrett, 1979)*
2. 3. SUPPLY.
Unlike most commodities, the supply of housing is dominated 
by existing stock. In 1968, when completions were at their highest, 
new housing only made up 2,3% of the stock, (Mayes 1979), and in 
1971, only 21^ of total house purchases, (Lansley 1979)• The rest of 
the supply of housing in any one tenure type, comes from second-hand 
homes, transfers from other tenures, and the rehabilitation of 
derelict stock, in addition to new build. Second-hand housing will 
become available when households dissolve, or move. These are 
represented in the owner-occupied sector, as sales, and in the rented 
sector, as re-lets. This picture of the supply process, can be 
simplified by a number of reasonable assumptions in the short-run.
Since Britain is not experiencing volatile demographic shifts, it is 
reasonable to assume that household dissolution, and household formation, 
are roughly balanced. Similarly, those households vacating houses 
will, except in the cases of dissolution, move into other houses, 
thus, leaving the overall supply characteristics roughly similar.
Given these assumptions, the crucial element in the supply process, 
in the short-run, is the rate of completions. The implication of 
this, is that since completions make up such a small part of the over­
all stock, small changes in demand, will have very large implications
for the supply of new houses, and in particular, upon the house­
building industry, (Mayes 1979 > Gough 1975> Whitehead 1974, Wilkinson 
and Archer 1976).
It is worth noting at this point, that to talk about the 
supply of housing as homogenous, is somewhat misleading. Housing is 
a complex commodity, which varies in size and quality, and which is 
inseparable from economically significant externalities, such as 
location, access and environment. Thus, at any given time, the housing 
stock will be highly heterogeneous, while the demand for housing may 
well be concentrated around certain types of property which possess 
what are considered desireable characteristics at that period of 
time. For example, if the mean family size was to fall significantly, 
then, all other things being equal, the demand for smaller houses 
would rise. Thus, the balance of supply and demand, is the product 
of a nexus of social and economic factors at a given point in time. 
Theoretically, this cam be characterised by dividing the housing market 
into a system of sub-markets, both economic and geographic, which 
can be differentiated from one another. A discussion of sub-markets 
would, however, be long and complex, and the issue has yet to be 
fully resolved, ( Schnore and Struyk, 1976 ).
Consequently, it is felt sufficient to note these complexities, and 
continue the discussion at the aggregate level.
As in discussions of demand, those concerning supply are 
probably best conducted by differentiating between the major tenure 
types.
2. 3.1. The Supply of New Housing in the Owner-Occupied Sector.
The vast majority of owner-occupied houses are built by speculative 
builders, (see section 1. 3*1.). Increasingly, local authorities
have built houses for sale, generally to encourage the tenure in 
areas where it has, traditionally, been absent, but they still account 
for a very small number of units. As was pointed out in Chapter One, 
the main suppliers are the large national and multi-national volume 
builders and, to a lesser extent, the medium sized, regional builders.
The supply of new housing has a cyclical character, (see 
Figure 2. 1.), which, in the long-run, appears to be related to Gross 
Domestic Product (G.D.P.), and wages, (Mayes 1979)* In the short-run, 
the supply of new housing is determined by the rate of completions, 
(Lansley 1979)* If the demand for owner-occupied houses increases 
significantly, the first thing builders will do, is increase the speed 
at which houses, at that time under construction, achieve completion. 
In the longer-run, it is the number of starts, which determines the 
supply of new housing, (Wilkinson and Archer, 1976).
Starts are much more volatile than completions, and reflect 
the builder's perception of a sustained increase in demand. Due to 
the precarious nature of the building industry, builders are very 
cautious, and will hold back their response until they feel sure that 
the higher level of demand will be sustained. When this caution is 
added to the complex and time-consuming nature of the industry, it 
is most unlikely that a house will be completed in under a year, and 
most take a considerably longer length of time. Consequently, there 
is an appreciable lag, between a rise in demand and the housing com­
pletions; it induces, which consists of a period of risk assessment 
and construction, (Drewett 1973)* It is this relationship, which 
results in the 'roller coaster' effect in the level of completions, 
which contributes considerably, to the high risks in the industry and 
to house price inflation, (Community Development Project, 1977)*
When the demand for new, owner-occupied housing increases, 
for example, through an increase in mortgages, leading to more 
latent demand being made effective, then the supply of housing will 
respond in the sluggish manner described above. Since supply does 
not react immediately to rising demand, an upward pressure will be 
exerted on prices of both new, and second-hand houses. Builders may 
well engage in frenzied activity, in the hope of being first onto 
the market, and so be able to realise super-normal profits. In order 
to maintain future levels of production, builders will enter the land 
maiket, to replace the land being built upon and, concomitant with 
this, will be a rise in the number of planning applications, for the 
same reasons. Thus, a rapid rate of production will exert an upward 
pressure upon land prices, and cause congestion in the planning system.
If demand then falls again, for example, because mortgages 
become tighter, the demand will suddenly drop off. But, because of 
the lag in the supply response, completions will continue at a higher 
rate, although starts will probably fall. If the slump is severe, 
the supply of new housing will, initially, far exceed demand, house 
prices will fall and builders may well make a loss, and even go bank­
rupt. Builders will respond by severely cutting back the level of 
starts.
Thus , a cyclical, pattern seems to be inevitable in the house 
construction industry, given fluctuating levels of demand, dependent 
in the short-term on the availability of mortgage finance, and on 
a supply industry, which is only capable of responding to demand 
highly imperfectly. This situation prevailed at the beginning of the 
1970's, and was fuelled by the expansionary monetary policy of the 
government. The effect was severe housing and land price inflation,
as the result of a slow supply response, followed by a collapse in 
both house prices and production. (See Figures 2. 1, 2. 2, 2. 3, 
and 2. 4). This was an exceptional period, and most building cycles 
do not have such severe consequences.
There are four main requirements in the production process, 
which have highly significant repercussions on the industry's ability 
to satisfy demand. These four, land, development finance, materials, 
and manpower, were discussed in section 1. 4. Here, their importance 
to the housing market is discussed, and some points concerning their 
influence over policy are sketched.
2. 3*2. Land and the Land Market - Both the cost and the availability 
of land have been the subject of major debate among those concerned 
with the development process, (DoE 1978, JURUE 1977, The Housebuilders 
Federation, undated). All the major actors in the process, tend to 
blame the other actors involved for the high cost and relative scarcity 
of development land. Landowners and builders have been accused of 
hoarding land for speculative gain, at the expense of housing con­
sumers, while planning policies have been blamed for scarcity and 
delays in availability.
Thera appears to be widespread agreement as to how the cost 
of land is determined, (Drewett 1973, Charles 1977, Balchin and Kieve 
1972). The price of housing land, it is argued, is derived from the 
demand for housing. The housebuilder, when determining what he can 
afford to pay for land, will estimate what selling price the local 
housing market can stand. FT'om this he deducts a normal profit 
and construction costs, and the resultant residual represents the 
maximum he is prepared to pay. Obviously, if he can obtain suitable 
land more cheaply, or his other costs are cheaper, (or the selling
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price higher), than anticipated, he will make super-normal profits.
And, conversely, if costs are higher, or selling price lower, he 
will make a loss, or inadequate profits. According to this theory, 
the housebuilder will pay the residual price in most cases, since 
there will be competition for the land from a number of builders, who 
will bid the price up to this ceiling. As for landowners, they 
cannot speculate on land, since the price will not rise above that 
residually determined by the market. The same applies to restriction 
to supply, imposed through the planning process, (Cameron 1981).
The problem with the theory of residually determined land 
prices, is that while it may apply in a relatively stable, or declining 
market, speculation does appear to be possible in cases of rising 
demand, a fairly regular occurance given the cyclical nature of the 
market. When demand increased rapidly during the early 1970's, not 
only the number, but also, the size of mortgages increased. In the 
short-term, this higher demand was met by an inelastic supply, prices 
soared and land prices rose as a percentage of total costs, (Charles,
1977)* Thus, landowner's are able to speculate by holding their 
land off the market, in anticipation of higher prices, and the 
incentive to increase supply will be dampened, as the extra profits 
will be shifted from the builder to the landowner. This process will 
be accelerated, if planning delays hold land off the market for a 
longer period, while demand is rising rapidly, (Hymn 1980).
It must not be forgotten, that housing is a highly hetero­
geneous commodity. This leaves the builder in a position to change 
the type of housing he will build, if land prices rise. For example, 
he my, assuming planning permission is granted and mrket conditions 
are favourable, reduce the size of housing, and so build a greater
number of housing units on the site. Alternatively, he may build 
high quality, and consequently, more expensive housing on the site, 
which will cany a higher, residual land price. Thus, in rapidly 
changing market conditions, speculation appears to be possible by 
both landowners and builders.
The availability of land has been central to the land debate, 
(JURUE 1977* The Housebuilders Federation - undated, DoE 1972 and
1978), and availability is, of course, linked to price. Apart from 
the willingness of owners to sell, (which is determined.by their 
individual asperations regarding the use and minimum selling price of 
the land - Cameron 1981), the main determinant of availability is 
the granting of planning permission. The land programming policies 
contained in the Structure Plans of the English counties and Scottish 
Regions, have been severely criticised by the housebuilding industry. 
The Housebuilders Federation, for example, has claimed that land made 
available through the English Structure Plans for the period 1980-85, 
would only permit a building rate 20% below that of the five year 
period up to I98O, (The Environment Committee, 1980). While the 
Manchester Survey of land availability, conducted by local house­
builders, local authorities and the DoE, found that there was a short­
fall in developable land, of 25% (DoE 1978).
One of the main obstacles to development lies in the different 
concept of ’availability' used by planning authorities and developers. 
In their consideration of development land, planning authorities 
will take into account, in gereral, all land with outstanding planning 
permission. Much of this land, however, may well be held in large 
land banks by medium sized local, builders, who use the banks at a 
very slow rate, and often obtain considerable profits through
speculation. In Strathclyde Region, for example, it was discovered 
that 17% of land defined as available, was held in banks owned by- 
just two local builders, (Strathclyde Regional Council, 1981). Thus, 
considerable tracts of land zoned for housing, are not available for 
development in the short-term.
Another problem is that local authorities, often in pursuance 
of policies specifically designed to further a specific planning 
objective, such as the regeneration of the inner-cities, will zone 
land which developers may feel is not viable. Such sites, so far as 
the developer is concerned, are not available, since they feel people 
will not buy houses in those areas, at high enough prices, (House­
builders Federation - undated). Lastly, the H.B.F. complain that 
many sites zoned for development are incapable of being adequately 
serviced, by sewers for example, and thus, supply is further reduced.
There are further difficulties in other operations of the 
planning system. The H.B.F. (undated) has complained that local 
authority plans are not effective plans at all, since so many of 
permissions granted are outside areas zoned for housing, while 
applications within those zonings are refused. This assertion has 
been backed up by research undertaken by the Joint Unit for Research 
into Urban Envimment (JURUE 1977)* Research in the West Midlands, 
showed that only of all applications for housing development were 
successful. Only 53*3% were successful in areas zoned for housing, 
while 3Q.3% of land released was non-conforming. The overall low 
level of permissions can be attributed to important planning criteria, 
such as green belt policy. But, the high number of permissions on 
non-conforming land, and the low number in areas zoned for housing, 
appears to indicate an implementation problem. The large number of
permissions granted after appeal is also a basis for concern.
The last constraint to supply, imposed by the planning system, 
is the length of time taken to process planning applications. JURUE, 
(l977)» found that even after outline permission had been obtained, 
most applications took 15 to 20 months before building started. One 
of the main problems noted by JURUE was that the system appeared to 
operate counter-cyclically. Thus, when the demand for housing land 
rose, the planning system was flooded and applications processed more 
slowly. Consequently, under conditions of fairly stable demand, it 
is probable that developers will be able to maintain a fairly stable 
supply of land through the development pipeline. But, if demand 
rises significantly, the increased number of applications this will 
induce, will slow down the planning process and so further exacerbate 
supply problems. JURUE felt that it was difficult to envisage a 
system that would not produce this effect, in a situation of fluctuating 
demand•
2. 3.3. Development Finance - Finance has already been discussed at 
length in section 1. ^.l.,but it is necessary to note here that if 
developers are to respond to rising demand, it is essential that 
funds are available to finance that response. If policy were used to 
increase demand, then, if sufficient development finance was not 
available, the industry's response would be sticky, and the consequences 
might be inflationary. The two main elements in finance are, its 
availability, and cost, and these are to a large extent, dependent on 
prevailing macro-economic policy, and the condition of the economy, 
in general. Under prevailing conditions, The Environment Committee 
felt that it was unlikely that output p.a. would rise above 160,000, 
due to finance constraints, (The Environment Committee, 1980).
2. 3 Manpower and Materials - Both manpower and materials have 
been discussed in Chapter One, (sections 1. ^.3.and 1. ^.^.), so it 
is sufficient to note the significance of different levels of demand.
In times of rising demand, as in the early 1970's, the supplies of 
materials and labour may not be sufficient, and shortages may occur, 
placing upward, pressure on costs. This is particularly so in the case 
of materials production, where the industry is highly concentrated, 
and monopoly pricing is possible, (Table 1. 5*)*
Where there is a slump, however, as at present, then excess 
capacity exists in the supply of both materials and labour. Unemploy­
ment in the building trade will be high, and many skilled operatives 
will leave the industry for more secure employment. This poses a 
problem when demand expands again, since supply will be sticky. 
Similarly, in the materials industry a fall in demand may cause factory 
and quarry closures, and these may prove difficult to bring back into 
production. Even if factories do not close, they may have to operate 
at below capacity, which means that economies of scale may not be 
realised, and unit costs will rise.
Thus, the level of demand exerts a highly significant influence 
over both the price, and availability of materials and labour, which 
could prove constraining to the industry. This situation is further 
complicated by the fact that, at any one time, only certain materials 
and skills may be in short supply, but they may be crucial to the 
overall supply process. Once again the significance of policy in its 
manipulation of supply is crucial.
2. 3*5» Supply in the Public Sector - Supply in the public sector, 
like demand, is an administrative rather than a market response.
Supply consists of re-lets, conversions
from other sectors, and new build. The supply from new build is 
determined by the effective demand described in section 2. 2.2.
The public sector must enter the market not only to find 
projects, but also to hire contractors and obtain land. Consequently, 
it is subject to the same constraints of land purchase and cost, as 
the owner-occupied sector. Local authorities do have an advantage, 
however, in that they contain the planning authority within them, 
and are thus, unlikely to have problems with planning refusals. 
Another advantage is that they possess Compulsory Purchase powers, 
given approval by the Secretary of State. Similarly, the contractors 
they hire, and D.L.O.'s will have the same problems of material and 
labour supplies. The supply of finance to the local authority hats 
been discussed in section 2. 2.2.
The public sector has acted in a roughly counter-cyclical 
manner, largely because contractors are keen to do public work when 
demand is low, (Community Development Project, 1977)* It has been 
suggested that this characteristic could be accentuated to iron out 
the cyclical nature of the industry.
Local authorities have been criticised by private developers 
for holding on to large urban land banks, from more prosperous times, 
for public projects which they can now no longer afford. It is 
claimed that this has exacerbated land supply problems in certain 
cities, such as Glasgow, (Cameron 1981). For the local authorities, 
however, a land bank will be advantageous if it wishes to increase 
supply.
2. k. CONCLUSION AND SUMMARY.
While demand for housing in the long-run, is determined by 
demographic change and the level of real incomes, in the short-run,
it is determined by the transfer of latent demand into effective 
demand, through the availability of house purchase finance, either 
in the form of mortgages, or local authority investment. The 
availability and cost of mortgages compared to the level of council 
rents, is the major economic factor determining tenure choice. Demand 
ftom both the public and private sectors will determine the cost and 
supply of land, material, and manpower, although rapid changes in 
the level of demand may exert a significant influence over both costs 
and availability. The role of planning in land availability appears 
to be problematic only where there is a sharp rise in demand, creating 
a bottleneck in the development pipeline.
If public policy is to be effective, it must be aware of the 
relationships inherent in the housing market. There is no point in 
policy being used to increase the supply of housing, by raising the 
level of demand, if that demand is only converted into increased 
profits for landowners, builders and material producers, without a 
rise in the number of completions. Policy makers must make the 
appropriate response of the building industry, a prime objective.
So far, policy initiatives have been discussed largely in 
passing, as a necessity in describing the structure of the house­
building industry, and the nature of the housing market. Chapter 
Four will describe present policy initiatives more fully, but first, 
the necessity for public intervention in the housebuilding industry 
will be discussed in Chapter Three.
CHAPTER THREE
RATIONALES FOR POLICY INTERVENTION IN THE HOUSING MARKET.
Before discussing the major governmental influences over 
the operations of the British housing market and the housebuilding 
industry in the next chapter, it is necessary to ask why inter­
vention is necessary at all. In an advanced capitalist society, such 
as Britain, most goods are distributed through the market mechanism, 
so why should housing be any different from other commodities? The 
answer to this question is not a simple one largely because govern­
ments tend to have more than one aim in mind when intervening. As 
Cullingworth has written :
’In no field more than housing is there such a multiplicity 
of possible objectives and such a wide range of techniques 
to meet them. One important implication of this is that 
the potential for conflict between different housing policies 
is large.' (1973, P»39)
In this chapter, four bases for intervention in the housing market are 
outlined, the first two representing the two main opposing theories 
for housing policy in advanced capitalist societies.
3. 2. HOUSING POLICY AS SOCIAL POLICY.
'The distinguishing feature of social policy is that 
the distribution of goods and services to which it relates 
is determined on the basis of an assessment of social need 
rather than as a result of market forces.*
(Cullingworth 1973, P«33)
With respect to housing this implies that the housing market is either 
incapable or its participants unwilling to provide the housing stock 
deemed to be socially desireable or necessary. Galbraith favours 
the former explanation :
'... the housebuilding industry functions well only in 
combination with a large, complex and costly array of 
public services.*
(1958, p.212, my emphasis)
Thus, the state must intervene in the market if the socially desireable 
objectives it has defined are to obtain. It is this philosophy 
which has dominated housing policy in Britain for most of the twen­
tieth century, and has been especially influential since the Attlee 
government.
There are two basic concepts which underlie the interventionist 
philosophy i those of supply and equity, (Lansley 1979)* A concern 
for supply is based upon the fear that the level of investment in the 
construction industry would be such, that the number of housing units 
required by society would not be forthcoming. This is generally, 
attributed to the special characteristics of the housing market, 
which hinder the smooth operation of its mechanism. But, even if 
policies cpuld be used to promote market effectiveness, it would pro­
duce a distribution of housing resources so inequitable, as to be 
socially unacceptable as defined by the state. The distribution of 
income in society is such, that low income groups would only be able 
to command housing of very poor quality. Even if a more equitable 
distribution of incomes was achieved, the importance of housing to the 
individual's standard of living is such, that the concept of consumer 
sovereignty would still produce undesireable consequences, (Lansley,
1979).
There are a number of characteristics which make the housing 
market both unusual and imperfect. Firstly, housing is highly hetero­
geneous, varying in age, size, repair, quality, amenity, location
and tenure. Thus, as pointed out in section 2. 2., the housing 
market is, in fact, a set of linked sub-markets, and thus, unlike 
other commodity markets,
Secondly, housing is very durable, lasting 40 - 100 years or more, 
and thus constitutes both a service and an investment, a peculiar 
characteristic. Thirdly, since the cost of housing is very high in 
relation to income, the consumer must rely upon intermediary institutions 
or individuals. Thus, owner-occupied housing is largely purchased 
through Building Societies and consequently, the supply and availability 
of finance will determine demand. In other tenures, housing must be 
rented and the demand exerted on the construction industry is, there­
fore, dependent upon investment by the landlord, public or private. 
Fourthly, owner-occupied housing has very high transaction costs, due 
to its complex legal status, thus, the employment of exchange profes­
sionals is necessary. Fifthly, as stated in section 2. 3»» supply is 
inelastic and consequently, a rise in demand may be translated into 
higher prices, rather than increased supply, (Lansley 1979)*
Thus, the housing market is distinct from other markets and 
the consequences of this for the supply and quality of housing has 
been deemed to require government intervention. The possibilities 
for intervention are vast :
*... these include land purchase and clearance for re­
development, good neighbourhood and city planning, and 
effective and well enforced zoning; a variety of financing 
and other aids to the housebuilder and the owner; publicly 
supported research and architectural services for an 
industry which, by its nature, is equipped to do little on 
its own, and a considerable amount of direct or assisted 
public construction...' (Galbraith 1958» p.212).
This multifarious array can be split into four main groups :
3. 2.1« Subsidies to Demand - These may be to rents, or to interest 
rates in the case of purchase, and they may be general, or specific 
to certain groups. The prime examples of this in Britain are tax 
relief on mortgage repayments, and subsidies to local authority rents.
3« 2.2. Subsidies to Supply - The principle in this case is that the 
house, rather than the household, is subsidised by payments to the 
builder, thus reducing costs to the consumer. In Britain this is 
largely pursued by the prevision of public housing.
3. 2.3. Government Controls - This was the first method used in 
Britain to influence the building industry, by establishing minimum 
building standards, in an attempt to combat jerry-building and over­
crowding. Rent control was added later, and landuse planning could 
also be included, (especially where the housing environment is 
improved by the separation of residential and anti-social - especially 
industrial - landuses, and through the establishment of maximum 
residential densities). The consequence of such policies may well be 
to raise costs, and therefore, might have to be used in association 
with subsidies. If prices do not rise, as in the case of rent control, 
then the tenant is, in effect, being subsidised by the landlord, 
through the reduction of his profit margin.
3. 2.^ -. Direct Government Provision of Housing - This has largly been 
pursued through local authority housing, and a little has, in effect, 
been provided by the provision of funds to housing associations.
This gives the state, control over the supply, quality and cost of 
housing.
3. 3* HOUSING POLICY AS A LUBRICANT TO THE MARKET MECHANISM.
The main opposition to far-reaching intervention by the state 
in housing provision, has been articulated by the Institute of Economic 
Affairs. To the Institute, the market represents the most efficient 
means of distributing housing resources, and '... by far the most 
serious impediments and distortions in the market are the result of 
legislative, fiscal and direct intervention in the market. To cure 
the effect of these would require an essentially simple but unified 
programme of reform based on income redistribution, undistorted choice 
and competitive supply that would call for fiscal integrity, sympathetic 
guidance and sustained stimulation.' (Pennance 19^9» P«58)»
According to this analysis, indiscriminate subsidies have led 
to the over-consumption of housing and land, which has contributed to 
urban sprawl, and resulted in cities of uneconomic size. Slum clearance 
has deprived the poor of cheap housing close to their employment, to 
the benefit of 'big business', who wish to expand the central business 
district, and the middle-class, who can move back to the now 'cleansed' 
central areas, (this is, perhaps, more applicable to the U.S. than the 
U.K.). Rent controls are a disincentive to investment and have led 
to a shortage of cheap, rented accomodation, (Hayek, i960). Local 
authority housing is also attacked :
'... cheaper housing provided by government will have to 
be strictly limited to the class it is intended to help ...'
(Hayek 1969. p.3^5).
otherwise, those in the income group immediately above the aided class 
will also demand better and subsidised housing, since the differential 
between these classes would be small, or non-existent. Thus '... any 
far-reaching change in housing conditions by public housing will be
achieved only if practically the whole of the housing of a city is 
regarded as a public service and paid for out of public funds.' (Hayek 
i960, p.3^5). This leads to the main criticism of social policy by 
the free-marketeers, that housing subsidies and public housing con­
stitute an infringement of personal liberties. Hayek continues his 
argument :
'This means, however, not only that people in general 
will be forced to spend more on housing than they are 
willing to do, but that their personal liberty will be 
gravely threatened.' (i960, p.p.3^5 “ 6).
Harris and Seldon sum the argument up more bluntly s
'The difference between unrepresentative democracy and 
the representative market is graphically demonstrated 
by British Housing Policy.' (1977» P»^3)»
The alternative strategy of the free-marketeers centres on the 
argument that, 'the bogey of so-called market imperfections is the 
nursery man-on-the-stairs of housing analysis.' (Pennance 1969,p.59)* 
Thus, '... there are only two main ways of securing improvement of 
housing standards in general; to increase the disposable income of 
households in need of improvement and to increase the stock of housing 
...indiscriminate housing subsidies should be replaced by income 
supplementation closely related to personal means and needs, local 
authorities should aim to increase flexibility in production, pricing 
and disposal of housing, owner-occupiers should cease to recieve 
discriminatory tax relief.' (Pennance 1969, p.p.50 - 51).
How the disposable income of the poor is to be raised, is a 
moot point. There appears to be two main arguments. The first is 
that such a redistribution should be totally unrelated to housing, 
since to specify expenditure on housing would be an infringement of
liberty. So, a general redistribution, perhaps a negative income 
tax, could be used, and if the poor desired better quality housing 
they could purchase it. The second is based upon means-tested 
housing vouchers, which could be exchanged for housing services,
(Rasmussen 1973)*
This type of strategy is often coupled to the theory of 
' filtering'. This holds that the greatest incentive to housebuilders 
lies in the construction of houses for upper income groups, where the 
profit margins are greater. As the better-off move into higher 
quality housing, their old housing 'filters' down to lower income 
groups, price falling with its desireability. Thus, a filtering chain 
is created, which will eventually lead to the improvement of housing 
conditions for those at the bottom of the pile. The problem with this 
theory is that even if housing does in fact, move down-market, (and 
there is some doubt about that), since lower income groups are much 
more numerous that the well-off, the latter will have to have a 
phenomenal turnover in houses to raise the former's housing conditions 
appreciably, (Boddy and Grey, 1979)*
Hayek does concede that some form of town planning does have 
a place :
"... 'town planning' which operates largely through the 
establishment of general conditions to which all development 
of a district or neighbourhood must conform but which 
within these conditions leaves the decisions to the 
individual owner, is part of the effort to make the market 
mechanism more effective." (i960, p.350)*
Hayek sees planning of this type overcoming the sticky problem of 
undesireable externalities, one of the central problems of the free-
market argument. Because housing units are immobile, unlike other 
commodities, a desireable house located next to (for example) a 
sewerage works, will not command the same price as an identical house 
next to a park. The use of zoning, by separating these uses, will 
ensure that such anomolies do not occur. A similar argument is used 
to justify area-based rehabilitation policies.
Some of the problems of the free-market approach have already 
been expounded in section 3« 2. The main problem is that market 
imperfections are not a 'bogey', they exist and their repercussions 
are highly significant. It is also very difficult, in Britain, to 
know how the housing market would react to such a drastic restructuring. 
Even if the disposable income of the poor were to be raised, would 
the building industry react favourably? The removal of subsidies to 
owner-occupiers might have the effect of depressing the supply industry 
and lead to a fall in housing standards. In the U.S.A., which has 
adopted similar, although not pure free-market policies, urban blight 
exists at an appauling level, while their public welfare housing is 
little more than institutionalised ghetto formation. An attempt to 
describe the counter-factual situation that would obtain in the U.K. 
if such policies were adopted, is difficult, but the evidence is not 
promising. The present Conservative government have moved in the 
direction of a free-market position, however. New public housebuilding 
is now almost totally confined to those with 'special needs', thanks 
to severe cuts in public expenditure and the imposition of a public 
housing moratorium in I98O. Similarly, council house rents have been 
raised and council housing sold-off. It is unlikely, however, that 
any government will remove general housing subsidies in the near 
future, as this might well prove to be electorally suicidal.
3. k. HOUSING POLICY AS PART OF MACRO-ECONOMIC POLICY.
Unlike the first two rationales for public intervention,
which are mutually exclusive, intervention as a means of regulating
economic activity as a whole, is compatible with both. Housing
policy possesses this dual character because of the importance of
output in
the industry to the economy in general. In 1975»A'the construction 
industry was £11,600 M, which was 12.5% of G.D.P., while employing 
7.5^ of the working population, (Balchin and Kieve, 1977)*
The way in which the industry is used as part of macro- 
economic strategy is dependent upon the economic philosophy of the 
government in power. Since the adoption of monetarist policies in 
the late 1970's in Britain, there has been a fall in the public 
expenditure devoted to local authority housebuilding and subsidies 
to local authority tenants, in order to reduce the Public Sector 
Borrowing Requirement, (PSBR). This can be seen as a movement to­
wards the free-market view. The problem with using the construction 
industry is that it will probably react sluggishly, since existing 
starts will have to be completed. There is also a problem in that, 
unless housing standards are allowed to fall, a reduction in con­
struction activity will only have a short-term effect, since work 
will only have to be done at a later date.
Alternative economic strategies hold that the construction 
industry, in conjunction with certain expansionary fiscal policies, 
can be used to increase economic activity. This view is receiving a 
great deal of attention at the moment, as an easy means of reducing 
unemployment, (The Guardian 5/2/1982, Shelter 1931). This argument 
runs that as construction is such a large industry and is so labour 
intensive, a relatively small amount of investment will have a large
impact on employment, without an inflationary effect, (Hilditch,
1981). Some would even argue that it could be used to lead the 
economy out of the recession. This is closely compatible with a 
policy of strong public intervention in the housing market.
3. 5. HOUSING POLICY AS AN ELEMENT OF GLASS STRUGGLE.
This view of housing policy is more of an implicit ideological 
construct, than an explicit policy objective. It has largely been 
propounded by Marxist analysts, and notably the Political Economy of 
Housing Workshop, (PEHW 1976) and the Community Development Project 
(1976). Neo-Weberian academics, notably Rex and Moore (1967) and 
Pahl (196 )^, have also examined the housing field from a class per­
spective. But, largely due to the nature of Weberian sociology, their 
analysis has concentrated upon the consumption, rather than the pro­
duction of housing. As a consequence of Marxism's central concept, 
the mode of production, Marxists have concentrated more on the impact 
of policy on the construction industry.
Briefly, Marxist analysis views the intervention of the state 
through housing policy, as an attempt to overcome contradictions 
inherent in the capitalist mode of production. This contradiction 
arises because certain elements of capital, notably landed capital 
and the construction industry, appropriate surplus value through 
housing. Thus, they have a vested interest in keeping housing costs 
high, so that the maximum amount of surplus value can be appropriated. 
This will be reflected by higher wage demands from the proletariat. 
Loan capital and industrial capital, on the other hand, appropriate 
capital through the production of commodities, and thus, have a 
vested interest in keeping wages low, so as to reduce production costs. 
This contradiction is further complicated, because the working class
is not considered as passive. If housing costs are high, or housing 
conditions poor, the working class will become restive and may 
threaten the dominant position of the ruling class. In order to 
defuse proletarian militancy, and to attempt to resolve the contra­
dictions within capital, the state will channel discontent into the 
formation of housing policies through participation in a form of 
liberal, representative democracy. Thus, housing policies will improve 
housing conditions and reduce costs, while maintaining the ideological 
conditions necessary for capital, as a whole, to continue to extract 
surplus value. Some factions of capital may suffer in the process, 
notably the building industry, but these set-backs will be accepted in 
the interests of perpetuating the system. Housing policies will 
always be in a state of flux, as the positions of the antagonistic 
classes change over time. (Ball 1975» Merrett 1979 > Ginsburg 1979)*
Thus, housing policies are viewed primarily as a means of 
perpetuating the capitalist mode of production, and only improve 
housing conditions incidentally, as a way of assuaging the wrath of 
the working class. The persistence of housing problems is seen as 
illustrative of the unsatisfactory nature of the solution, which can 
only be solved by the overthrow of the capitalist system, and if ho.usj.ng 
is provided on the basis of need, rather than for profit. Housing 
policies are essentially concessions won from capital through the 
process of class struggle, but they can be regarded as defeats, in the 
long-run, since working class militancy is dampened and the revolution 
is placed further into the future.
These theories pose some difficulty for social scientists, as 
they are almost impossible to test, (Saunders 1979)* Since the real 
meaning of policy is supposedly covert, since it lies at an ideological
level, data to test these theories is difficult, if not impossible, 
to collect. A second problem lies in the fact that housing has 
improved appreciably for the working class, and it is highly probable 
that this can be attributed to housing policies. How, then, can these 
real gains for the working class be considered as defeats ? They can 
only be envisaged as such, if it is first accepted that a revolution 
is ultimately in their interests, and if the concessions obtained 
put that revolution off. Thus, the Marxist argument only holds an 
internal logic dependent upon an a priori belief in a particular 
solution.
What does seem indisputable, however, is that housing is a 
scarce resource, and that economically determined classes compete 
with one another to obtain their share of it. Housing policy plays a 
crucial role in distributing housing resources, and consequently, is 
inseparable from class struggles. This does not mean, however, that 
lower income groups have been fobbed off with inconsequential housing 
reforms, nor that their interests are better pursued by revolution 
than by participation in representative democracy.
3. 6. CONCLUSIONS.
There are two main rationales for public intervention in the 
housing markets of advanced capitalist societies. The first, prevalent 
in Britain, is that the market cannot, or will not, provide housing 
at a high enough standard, and in sufficient quantities, on its own. 
Consequently, policy must be used to distort the market mechanism to 
produce the desired housing stock. The second, holds that the market 
is the most efficient and reliable way of distributing housing 
resources, and that housing policy distorts this mechanism, so 
reducing its efficiency, and curtailing personal freedoms. The
evidence seems to suggest, however, that the market is unable to 
satisfy the needs of lower income groups, and for this reason, as 
well as for the political difficulties posed by free-market policies, 
interventionist policies are likely to prevail in Britain.
The two other rationales outlined, view housing as secondary 
and subservient to the more important macro-economic policies, and 
the more potent force of class struggle. Both may be envisaged as 
consistent with the first two rationales, although both are also 
dependent upon other events within government and society as a whole.
The next chapter will discuss present British housing policy 
and its implications for the housebuilding industry and the housing 
market.
CHAPTER FOUR
NATIONAL AND LOCAL HOUSING POLICY.
In Britain the state intervenes in the operations of the 
housing field at both the national and the local level. This chapter 
attempts to describe that policy framework, and attempts to assess 
the significance of the influence exerted by policy-makers on the 
house construction industry and the housing market. At the national 
level, this influence is exerted largely through macro-economic policy 
and the housing finance system. National and local initiatives con­
verge in the formulation of local authority Housing Plans and H.I.P.s, 
which together with the planning system, constitute the mechanisms of 
local policy influence over both the private and the public sector’s.
It is hoped that the inter-dependence of national - and local - policy 
making, will be highlighted, while policy as a whole is examined 
critically.
2. MACRO-ECONOMIC POLICY AND HOUSING POLICY.
'... I am pursuing... within the constraints of an 
economy in decline, the housing policies most fitted to 
a situation where we have the largest crude surplus ever 
and where the essential challenge is to make better use 
of the existing housing stock.*
(Michael Hesaltine, Secretary of State for the Environment, speaking 
to the Environment Committee, 7/6/81 - 
The Environment Committee, 1981 p.15)
Michael Hesaltine*s statement neatly encapsulates a number of themes 
which are central to the present government’s housing policy. The 
first, and most important strand is the close relationship between 
housing policy and macro-economic policy. To use the typology of the 
previous chapter, the dominant rationale for intervention in the housing 
market at present, is that of 'housing policy as part of macro-economic
policy.’ The present administration is not unique in this, the 
previous Labour government also adopted the current strategy of cut­
ting public expenditure in order to reduce the P.S.B.R., but the 
Conservatives have carried this policy to its furthest extreme to date.
The government's plans for its term of office were outlined 
in the Public Expenditure White Paper 1981/82, 1983/^1 ( Cmnd. 8175)* 
Referring to these plans, the Chancellor of the Exchequer stated :
'In today’s circumstances, any government would have to 
check the size and growth of public spending. This does 
not mean, and has not meant, that public expenditure 
should be cut indiscriminately.'
(Planning 4/^/l98 0).
Indeed, the cuts have not been indiscriminate, they have discriminated 
to a very large extent against public expenditure on housing. The 
plans provide for a reduction in expenditure on housing of 7^.6% 
between 1981/2 and 1983/^. This accounts for 75% of the reduction in 
total programme plus contingency reserve. But, according to paragraph 
10 of the White Paper, ( Cmnd. 8l75)> 92% of the reduction in public 
expenditure is to be found by reducing the financial provisions for 
housing. To describe the cuts in housing as essential to the govern­
ment's macro-economic strategy would be an understatement, they are 
virtually coterminous. Estimates of expenditure are given in Table f^.l.
In macro-economic terms this policy is claimed to be part of 
a strong monetary policy, with strict monetary controls and high 
interest rates, in order to combat inflation. As part of this strategy, 
the public expenditure cuts are designed to reduce the P.S.B.R. In 
fact, monetary supply targets have not been adhered to, and public 
expenditure has increased by 2% in the past two years,(McLennan 1982b).
The implications of this economic policy for housing are vast. Not 
only has the public housebuilding programme been brought almost to 
a halt, (in the first half of 1981 housing starts were 17,^ 400, whereas 
in 1978 they were over 50,000), but also, the costs of private house­
building have been increased through higher interest rates, and 
demand has fallen for private housing, as there has been a concomitant 
fall in real income and job security, and a rise in unemployment.
Table k, 1. Public Expenditure on Housing 1979/80 - 1983/8^ (Projected).
Financial Year Expenditure (£M) at Housing Expenditure as % of
1930 Survey Prices Total Government Expenditure
197^ /75 - 10.Q%
1979/80 5,372 5.W0
1980/81 ^,700
1931/82 3,3^0
1982/83 3,250
1933/3^ 2,790 Z-9%
(Source : The Environment Gommittee 1980 and 1981).
The government argues that the cuts are necessary because
1... as a nation we cannot afford to devote as many of our resources 
to public sector housebuilding... (consequently) private housebuilders 
will have an even more important contribution to make over the next 
few years than in the past,* (Hesaltine 1931, p»l)« The government's
policy, then, is two-edged. Public housing is to be cut back,and the 
private sector is to step in to fill the breach. This analysis, 
however, is on an ideological level, assumptions have been made about 
the nature of the housing market and the housebuilding industry, which 
cannot be verified, and are deeply misguided. These misconceptions 
centre on three related aspects : the housing needs of the population
and the ability of people to satisfy those needs in the owner-occupied 
sector; the cost of housing to the government through the housing 
finance system; and the ability of private sector housebuilders to 
expand their production to fill the gap left by the public sector.
2.1. Housing Needs and the Costs of Qwner-Occupation..- 
'... it appears to the Committee that the government has 
as a matter of policy, deprived itself of information 
which is necessary for sound decisions to be taken.'
(The Environment Committee 1981).
So, in their Third Report, the Environment Committee chastised the DoE 
for formulating policy without attempting to estimate what housing 
needs were likely to be in the future, and what level of construction 
was likely to obtain to meet these needs, given the policies being 
pursued. This reflects the government's perception of housing need as 
being subservient to the P.S.B.R. But, even given this priority, which 
is obviously the subject of some controversy, by choosing not to 
evaluate the consequences of its actions, the government is stifling 
public debate. The Secretary of State attempted to justify this 
'nanny knows best* attitude by claiming that forecasts of both need 
and supply were always inaccurate, and therefore, not worth making. 
Consequently, the DoE has made no forecasts since the Housing Policy 
Green Paper (DoE 1977), and these are now considered by the Secretary 
of State to be of dubious use and accuracy.
The Environment Committee rejected the Secretary of State's 
objections to both the Green Paper and to the usefulness of forecasting 
(The Environment Committee 1980 and 1^81). The Green Paper estimated 
that in I98I, 125,000 houses would have to be completed in the public 
sector, and between 170,000 and 190,000 in the private sector (DoE 1977)*
But, the actual building rates have fallen well below this, since 
in 1930 the figures were 59,000 and 101,000 respectively, and the 
trend for 1931 is downward, (Housing and Construction Statistics
1982). The Environment Committee went so far as to make their own 
projections of public sector starts, and placed the level for 1983/^ 
between 26,500 and ^7,000, depending upon the rate of rent increases 
and council house sales. This means that the number of completions 
estimated to be needed in the public sector in 1986 of between
115,000 and 125,000, would be virtually impossible to meet. It must 
be acknowledged that the concept of 'need' is a highly subjective 
one, but the Green Paper’s estimates are considered to be, to a large 
extent, valid by many, (Shelter 1982, The Environment Committee I98O), 
and underestimates by others, (Lansley 1979, Merrett 1979)*
One of the main reasons given by the Secretary of State for 
his reticence to forecast is that so many of the agencies providing 
housing are outside his control. The level of public sector house­
building could be higher, he argues, if local authorities raise money 
by the sale of assets to the private sector, and in particular, by the 
sale of council housing and council land to housebuilders. While the 
level of activity in the private sector is dependent upon private 
initiative which, he claims, he can help only by reducing the P.S.B.R. 
and thus, the level of interest rates. Forecasting, he argues, is 
the job of local authorities through the Housing Plan and H.I.P. 
systems, although he has not attempted to aggregate these estimates. 
This is plainly the duplicitous argument of a politician attempting 
to avoid public criticism. Other government departments feel able to 
make predictions about factors which are more complex and less subject 
to government control, and indeed, form the basis for justifying the 
cuts in public expenditure in the first place. The Chancellor of the
Exchequer feels able to forecast the performance of the whole economy, 
yet the Secretary of State for the Environment cannot forecast the 
performance of one part of it, which he can affect fundamentally, 
through the provision of capital to local authorities.
The real reason for this reluctance to forecast needs and 
production levels, must surely be that the government would be seen 
to be deepening the real human miseries of an inadequate supply of 
decent housing. To talk of a ’crude housing surplus' is a red herring 
designed to deflect attention from housing stress. In 1976 there were
500,000 more dwellings than households, but many are unfit to live in, 
or are waiting to be sold or repaired. 200,000 of those houses are 
second homes, and therefore, unavailable to those in housing need, 
while many are quite simply, in locations where housing stress is not 
great, (Shelter 1982). Yet the need for housing is rising, by 1986 
there will be 800,000 more households than in 1931, (Social Trends 
1932), while there are a vast number of ’concealed' households, (i.e. 
those wishing to have their own household, but forced to share), who 
never appear in official statistics, except the ever-lengthening 
council house waiting lists, (Table k, 2.). To these could be added 
the 700,000 households living in unfit houses, the 950,000 with sub­
standard homes, the 150,000 in overcrowded conditions, and the
1,000,000 sharing accomodation. After overlaps are accounted for, 
this leaves 2.7 million households in England and Wales alone.^ 
(Shelter 1932, The Environment Committee 1981).
All figures apply to 1976.
Table 4. 2. Council House Waiting List Totals in England and Wales*
Region
(1)
1931
(2)
1932
(3)
Average
1977-79
% of change 
compared to
North 90,400 101,327 90,960 - 1
Yorkshire and 
Humberside 146,539 146,553 132,431 +11
North West 145,660 1^4,545 135,938 + 7
West Midlands 104,089 100,974 87,147 +19
East Midlands 104,077 94,703 90,109 +16
East Anglia 37,915 36,616 30,421 +25
South East 195,737 197,381 184,453 + 6
Greater London 234,001 241,775 209,123 +12
South West .31,519. 80,356 .. 75,274 + 3
England 1,140,037 1,144,240 1,032,679 +10
Wales 56,932 ......^ , , 5.7,2 +17
England and 
Wales 1,197,019 1,200,694 1,081,253 +11
(Source : Shelter Local Authority Annual Survey - Shelter 1982).
The government’s solution to the fall in the supply of council 
housing is to call for a movement into the owner-occupied sector.
This policy has fundamental drawbacks, which raise doubts as to its 
capacity to contribute significantly to the relief of housing need.
The most fundamental inconsistency in this argument is that many people 
simply cannot afford to buy their housing, (Table 4. 3»). About 66.2% 
of households in the U.K. who are at present non owner-occupiers, fall 
into this category, and are thus, immediately excluded from the sector 
unless something can be done to significantly reduce their housing 
costs. What is more, the government’s economic policy makes owner- 
occupation more expensive by pushing up mortgage interest rates, 
(although these have fallen following the March 1932 Budget, they are 
still high), and by lowering real incomes and lessening job security.
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Another major drawback is that those low-income households who do 
buy their own homes, may be financially incapable of keeping them in 
good repair, and consequently, the stock may deteriorate, (Karn 1979)*
Thus, the government is pursuing a policy which is incapable 
of ensuring that the population has an adequate supply of decent 
housing at a price they can afford, which was the central tenet of 
that 1977 Green Paper, (DoE 1977)* The promotion of the owner- 
occupied sector is being advocated, yet about half of the population 
does not have an income which can support- a mortgage. The main alter­
native sector is being starved of funds for capital expenditure, and 
rents are being forced higher. The results of such a policy, seem 
inevitably, to be the lowering of housing standards, and the raising 
of housing costs.
fy. 2.2. The Housing Finance System and its Impact on Public Expenditure 
The main justification for the pursuance of this policy is that a 
reduction in living standards, in the short-term, will have long-term 
benefits, since P.S.B.R. will be reduced as part of a policy of 
restructuring the national economy. So, if we accept the government’s 
own definition of the situation, the important question to ask is 
whether this policy will reduce P.S.B.R. In answering this it is 
necessary to examine the housing finance system, and in particular, the 
nature of government subsidies. The housing finance system is also 
important to our discussion, since it embodies subsidies to both supply 
and demand, and is thus, the central instrument of national govern­
mental influence over the house construction industry.
In the public sector, subsidies are made by central govern­
ment through the Housing Support Grant (H.S.G.), and by local 
government through the Rate Fund Contribution (R.F.C.). The rest of
the income to the local authority Housing Revenue Account (H.R.A.), 
the financial system used by local housing authorities, comes from 
unrebated rents. The main areas of expenditure on the H.R.A. are 
loan charges, (discussed in section 2. 2.2.), supervision and manage­
ment, and repairs and maintenance. The H.R.A. must balance, that is, 
expenditure must equal or be less than income, and the H.S.G. is 
designed to make up the deficit in the notional H.R.A., so that this 
occurs. In practice this is one of the main methods of central govern­
ment control, since the Secretary of State defines in advance a 
local authority's subsidy entitlement, and assesses the extent to 
which costs can be met through rents and the R.F.G. Until 1981/2, 
the balance between rents and the R.F.G. was the responsibility of 
individual authorities. Housing Expenditure Limits (H.E.L.) have now 
been introduced, however, which establishes an R.F.G. guideline for 
each authority. If an authority exceeds its guideline figure, it has 
an equivalent amount taken off its H.R.A. capital allocation (i.e. 
the amount that can be borrowed in any one year for the purposes of 
capital expenditure). (Shelter (Scotland) I98I, Shelter 1931, Merrett
1979).
The implicit strategy of the H.E.L. is to reduce public expen­
diture by trying to reduce costs to the ratepayer, and increase 
council rents. But, the nature of the guidelines is such that they 
are barely related to previous expenditure and, consequently, many 
councils were faced with the prospect of enormous rent increases. In 
Scotland alone, 17 councils would have had to raise rents by over 50% 
(Shelter (Scotland) 1981). In the event, about half of all authorities 
failed to meet their guidelines, raised their rents by a lower level 
and suffered an additional cut in their capital allocation. Thus, 
the proportion of local authority housing costs met by central government
{U
!
through the H.S.G. has fallen, and this extra burden has had to be 
met by local rent payers.
Much of these apparent savings to public expenditure are 
illusory, and the overall strategy is short-sighted. That extra 
burden now carried by rent payers might be expected to be a saving 
to the government, but many low income families have fallen victim 
to rent rises, and so, public expenditure has simply been transferred 
to rent rebates and Supplementary Benefit. The rest of the savings 
to central government have been made up of increased R.F.G. andthus, 
the burden has passed to the local tax payers. H.E.L. has had the 
additional undesireable effect of moving public expenditure away 
from capital spending and into current spending, thus, the ability 
of councils to build more housing has been additionally cut.
The DoE had made it clear that local authorities are to 
finance their capital expenditure through the sale of assets to the 
private sector. Council house sales, in particular, have been singled 
out as applicable to raising money for new council housing, yet it 
has been estimated that twelve council houses have to be sold to 
build one new council house, (The Environment Committee, 1980).
Thus, for any substantial public building programme to take place, a 
phenomenal number of council houses would have to be sold. For 
example, if the Green Paper*s estimated need for council housing in 
1931 was to be attained, then approximately 300,000 council houses 
would have to be sold to attain 125,000 new build.^ The actual number
^ This assumes that there were 100,000 completions in 1981 on the 
basis of figures for the first half of that year. Therefore :
125.000 - 100,000 x 12 = 300,000.
If the number of starts rather than completions is used, the figures 
become more improbable :
125.000 - 20,000 x 12 = 1,260,000
(Housing and Construction Statistics, I9S2).
of council house sales has come nowhere near this, (Table fy. ^.), 
consequently, this figure will either not be obtained or substantial 
amounts of money will have to be raised through council house rents 
and the sale of other assets. The indiscriminate sale of council 
houses is, in any case, an act of mole-like myopia, so far as the 
level of local authority assets is concerned. The council housing 
which will be bought will inevitably be that of the highest physical 
quality and amenity. Consequently, councils will be left with the 
least desireable housing, and the most expensive to maintain. Thus, 
not only will the quality of council housing fall, but costs will 
also rise, and so will rents, as the system of rent pooling is under­
mined. Despite the government's claim that most homes will be sold 
to sitting tenants, and will therefore not affect council house 
allocations, it has been estimated that for every 100,000 council 
houses sold, there will be 2,600 fewer re-lets each year, (Select 
Committee on the Environment, 1981)* Thus, the public sector is 
caught in a 'Catch 22' situation : if a credible building programme 
is to be maintained, rents must rise and assets must be sold; yet, if 
attempts are made to hold down rents, more assets will have to be 
sold, and the more council housing that is sold the higher rents will 
be.
Subsidies for the owner-occupied sector come from a number 
of sources, but the nature of thefinance system is such that the 
subsidy of overwhelming importance, is mortgage interest tax relief. 
The Green Papers on Housing Policy, (DoE 1977, Scottish Office, 1977) 
treat mortgage interest tax relief as the main housing subsidy, and 
not, as some would argue, exemption from tax on imputed rent. Both 
cannot be considered as a subsidy at the same time, since they are
essentially two sides of the same coin. Indeed, tax was charged on 
imputed rent up to 1963, when it was repealed before an impending 
election, (Shelter (Scotland) I98I, Fowley 1979)* Tax foregone on 
the interest element of mortgage payments only applies to mortgages 
up to £25,000, and on condition that the house in question is the 
sole or main residence of the mortgagor. The subsidy is highly 
regressive, since the larger the mortgage (and presumably the more 
expensive the house), and the higher the rate of tax the mortgagor 
pays, then the greater the subsidy will be. Those paying little or
no tax, do not benefit from the scheme. Consequently, since 1968
they have been able to claim the option mortgage subsidy. This enables 
mortgagors to make repayments at a reduced rate of interest, which 
amounts to the subsidy received through tax relief at the standard 
rate of income tax.
Table 4-. 4-. The Sale of Local Authority Dwellings.
Number of Capital Value Initial Payments Average
Dwellings (£ thousands) Received Discount
(£ thousands) (%)
1978 30,0^5 248,350 80,400
1979 41,660 396,500 105,800 26
1930 31,465 768,900 208,900 39
1931
1st Quarter 14-, 120 14-1,100 51,4-00 39
2nd Quarter 17,995 180,500 64-,500 39
(Source s Housing and Construction Statistics, June Quarter 1931,
Part 2, Number 6 ).
There are a number of serious drawbacks with this kind of 
general subsidy. The first is that it is regressive, yet it is 
lower income groups who find most difficulty in exerting an effective
demand in the owner-occupier sector. Secondly, so far as the stimu­
lation of the house construction industry is concerned, it is likely 
to be ineffective. If, as postulated in section 2. 3*1♦» builders 
will charge what the market will stand, then by raising what consumers 
can pay will simply raise land and house prices, (Lansley 1979, Karn 
1979) • Thirdly, and most important to the government's overall 
strategy, this type of subsidy is extremely difficult to control. If 
interest rates, or house prices (in real terms), or the number of 
purchasers or the rate of taxation rise, then the level of the subsidy 
will rise. What is more, the government's policy is pulling in oppo­
site directions at the same time. Its monetarist economic policy has 
raised the level of interest rates, and its overt housing policy is 
to increase the levels of owner-occupation, both of which will raise 
the amount of subsidy paid, and so public expenditure. What is more, 
unlike the subsidy to the public sector, the tax relief subsidy is not 
treated as public expenditure, but as tax revenue foregone by the 
Inland Revenue. Consequently, despite the fact that it represents 
the largest subsidy to the housing sector, it does not appear in the 
calculations of the Public Expenditure White Paper (although the Option 
Mortgage subsidy does, since it constitutes a payment from the 
Exchequer to lending institutions). The subsidy to local authority 
tenants fell from £1,749 M in I980/8I to £1,011 M in 1981/82, while 
direct tax allowances on mortgages have risen from £1,450 to £1,960 M 
(all at 1979 prices), this constitutes a substantial increase of 
between 20% and 25:%. Shelter claim that the mean subsidy now paid to 
local authority tenants is £153, while that paid to owner-occupiers 
is £306. The DoE was unable to confirm or deny Shelter's figures 
(The Environment Committee 1981). What is more, better-off owner- 
occupiers receive additional subsidies because housing is exempt from
Capital Gains Tax. So, not only is the government's policy inequitably 
weighted in favour of owner-occupiers, but also, by encouraging the 
movement of people into the more heavily subsidised tenures, the 
government is acting counter to its objective of reducing P.S.B.R.
4-. 2.3* The Ability of the Private Sector to Respond - The government 
has explicitly stated that it expects public expenditure on housing 
to drop, and that the private sector will 'take up the slack', by 
producing more houses for owner-occupation. Leaving aside questions 
of possible conflict with macro-economic policy, the main question is 
whether private housebuilders are capable of responding when it is 
presently at its lowest production level since the Second World War.
The major difficulties for the house construction industry 
centre on the supply of finance and land. The only recent study of 
the capacity of private housebuilders under prevailing central govern­
ment policy has been carried out by Stevenson for the Environment 
Committee, (1930). By pushing up interest rates, the government has 
squeezed the construction industry by increasing the cost of borrowing 
for production and land banking. Meanwhile, the slump in the industry 
has made the shares of many companies less attractive than other 
forms of investment, and this affects the amount a company is able to 
borrow through its gearing ratio. The gearing ratio is the amount 
banks will lend against a company's share capital, and for the building 
industry that ratio is usually 1 : 1 .  Stevenson has estimated that 
the gearing ratio for the construction industry as a whole, would 
have to rise to 1 j If to fulfil the estimated need for private 
housing identified in the Housing Green Paper. But, he believes that 
the availability of house purchase finance is the crucial constraint 
upon the private sector. The Building Societies have suffered
competition from other financial institutions, such as insurance 
companies and pension funds. Consequently, it seems unlikely that 
an output of over 150,000 units can be achieved p.a. by 1934.
Stevenson perceives that the availability of suitable developable 
land would only be a problem if production managed to exceed 150,000, 
although local markets have distinctive characteristics about which 
it is difficult to generalise. Localised shortages of development 
land cannot, therefore, be discounted as a possible constraint to the 
industry's response. Stevenson has perceptively pointed out that the 
decline in the industry is affecting firms differently. The volume 
builders appear to be still expanding, (for example, the leading 
company, Barratts, announced record profits this year - Financial 
Times 16/3/1982, Guardian 16/3/1932), while the medium sized, local 
builders have fallen into a steep decline. The decline of the industry 
in general, also raises questions about the extent to which it will 
be possible for the industry to recover from this slump if bankruptcies 
have removed part of its productive capacity, (see Chapter One).
4-. 3. THE LOCAL HOUSING POLICY CONTEXT.
So far, this chapter has illustrated how a great deal of 
housing policy, at the local level, is in effect dictated by central 
government policy, and especially through the reduction of funds for 
capital expenditure on council housing. What discretion is left to 
local authorities is largely exercised through the H.I.P. and Housing 
Plan systems, and through the planning system.
The Housing Plan (in Scotland) and H.I.P. (in England and 
Wales) systems were established following the Green Papers on Housing 
policy in 1977, (Scottish Office 1977, BoS 1977)* Both systems were 
designed to ensure that local authorities devised comprehensive
housing strategies for their areas, which would secure the best use 
of available housing resources, in both the public and the private 
sectors. This is to be achieved within the constraints of national 
public expenditure policy. The main difference between the two systems 
is the way in which the block grants from central government are cal­
culated, and this is unimportant for the purposes of our discussion. 
Since each plan is unique to the area,it cover's, only general comments 
can be made about the systems, a more detailed discussion of the 
Glasgow area and its local housing policy follows in the next chapter.
These new systems were introduced against the background of 
the tightening of public expenditure as a central tenet of macro- 
economic policy. It was hoped that housing expenditure could be 
controlled by central government, but that the resources that were 
made available would be utilised more effectively through the compre­
hensive assessment of local housing needs. At one and the same time, 
local authorities' expenditure was restricted, but they were given
greater responsibility and autonomy over the resources they did receive.
every year,
The plans cover a five year period, and are rolled forward A each plan 
covering three main policy areas. The first is an analysis of the 
provision of housing, and assesses all present and future local needs 
in both the public and the private sectors. The second describes the 
local authority's housing policies and programmes and explains what 
is expected of other agencies, such as private builders and housing 
associations. The third is a costed capital programme outlining the 
local authority's preposed spending on housing over the next five 
years. (Haywood 1931, The Housing Monitoring Team 1930, Bramley et al 
1930, Leather 1979)*
It has been argued (in section 4-. 2.) that central government's 
grip on local authority housing expenditure has become extremely tight,
especially since the introduction of H.E.L. This has ’... left a 
general view that the H.I.P. system does not represent a completely 
new system which is designed to alter the style of policy making, but 
is simply a refinement to financial control, which significantly 
reduces local autonomy.’ (Bramley et al, 1930 p.29)* This has led 
the Environment Gommittee (1981) and others (for example, Morris 1930) 
to conclude that the increased level of local autonomy has been more 
than outweighed by the stringent constraints of central government. 
Indeed, the cuts have also constrained the private sector, since local 
authorities provide a large number of mortgages (11/& in 1975 ” ®ee 
Table 2. 3*)» a large number of grants for the rehabilitation of 
privately owned property, engage in environmental improvement in 
private residential areas, and provide owner-occupied houses themselves 
through build-for-sale projects.
In many ways the joint influence of housing departments and 
planning departments of local authorities are best illustrated in the 
private sector. Planning policies, (both local and structure), relate 
directly to land availability, the location and density of new develop­
ment, the provision of infrastructure, and a range of other services. 
Obviously, it should be the case that the H.I.P. and Housing Plan 
policies are compatible with local and structure plans,-but conflict 
is frequent, (Bramley et al, 1930), which is hardly surprising since 
local plans often fail to conform to structure plans. Local authorities 
will estimate the need for private housing as part of its general 
assessment of needs in the locality, and this will form the basis for 
land release policies for the private sector. As was stated in section 
2. 3*2., the amount, quality, location, servicing and commercial 
viability of the land, may not be to the liking of private developers. 
According to the H.B.F. (undated) land release policies have restricted
the supply of housing and forced up house prices. There are frequent 
complaints from private housebuilders that planners, and other local 
authority employees, do not understand the nature of the private 
housing market. Consequently, policy statements may indicate a pre­
ference for a density of housing, or house sizes, or location, which 
either individually or in combination, the private sector feel they 
cannot produce houses at an adequate profit. This lack of under­
standing is not aided by the nature of the relationship between 
private builders and planners, which tends to be antagonistic, since 
it revolves around bureaucratic restrictions imposed upon the private 
sector. Consequently, co-operation is rare and is often centred on 
certain specific issues, such as land availability surveys, (JURUE 
1977).
Private developers will engage in market research to establish 
the existence of a viable market in an area, but builders also rely 
on governmental forecasting at both the national and the local level. 
This reliance is born out of the precarious nature of the industry, 
and forecasting is used as another tool in reducing commercial uncer­
tainties, (The Environment Committee, 1980). Nonetheless, local 
forecasts are often criticized as underestimating demand, although 
this may represent a ploy by builders to pressurize local authorities 
into releasing more land so that they can build up larger land banks.
The importance of forecasting to the private sector is also indicative 
of the folly of central government in ceasing to produce national 
forecasts.
4-. 4-. CONCLUSIONS.
The current central government housing strategy is inseparable 
from the professed macro-economic strategy to reduce public expenditure, 
andso the P.S.B.R., in order to combat inflation. It has failed in
two crucial respects. Firstly, much of the apparent savings to the 
Exchequer are illusory, since increased council house rents are often 
passed on to other state expenditures through Supplementary Benefit / 
and rent rebates. What is more, the policy of promoting the owner- 
occupied sector is encouraging people to move into a sector where the 
government can exercise little control over the level of subsidy it 
pays, and which carries, in any case, a higher subsidy per household. 
Secondly, this policy is being pursued with a callous disregard for 
housing needs. As housing problems worsen, production levels drop in 
both sectors, and government policy squeezes the industry through 
H.E.L. and the maintenance of high interest rates. As for local 
initiative, this is largely dictated by central government policy.
With public initiative effectively made impotent by H.E.L., the best 
local government can do is attempt to stimulate the depressed private 
building industry.
Chapter Five is set against this background of local and 
national housing policy. It is concerned with the pursuance of one 
policy, the promotion of owner-occupation within the City of Glasgow, 
in the hope that this will prove illustrative of the interactions 
between policy makers and the building industry, in a way that 
general discussion cannot.
CHAPTER FIVE
THE PROMOTION OF PRIVATE HOUSEBUILDING IN GLASGOW.
The promotion of private housebuilding in the City of Glasgow 
affords a good opportunity to study the influence of policy makers 
on housebuilders. This policy is particularly relevant in the contem­
porary context, since the encouragement of new-build owner-occupied 
housing, as opposed to the building of public housing, is a dominant 
theme at both the national and the local level. The previous chapter 
illustrated that new housebuilding in the private sector, is econo­
mically and ideologically central to the present Conservative 
administration's policies, almost to the exclusion, and certainly the 
diminution, of public initiative. At the local level, the promotion 
of owner-occupation as a major objective of local authority strategies 
is being pursued in many cities for the first time, (Harrison 1982, 
Nicholls et al 1980), and it marks a particular departure in the 
policies of Glasgow District Council. An examination of local policy 
making is particularly relevant at this juncture of the discussion, 
since the previous chapter allowed only a cursory examination of 
local policy making. The unique nature of local housing policies 
makes the in-depth study of a particular example especially appropriate.
5. 2. THE POLICY AND PLANNING CONTEXT.
The policy to encourage private housebuilding in Glasgow has 
long and tenacious roots in both national and local policy. At both 
levels there are essentially three ' root systems', which provide the 
theoretical basis and political impetus necessary for its adoption.
The first of these policy strands was drawn out of a general 
dissatisfaction with post-war housing policies, and the changing 
nature of urban problems which emerged during the I960's. The quali­
tative shortage of decent housing following the war, pushed policy
makers into a 'number's game', in which important qualitative consid­
erations were overlooked in the general atmosphere of a 'housing 
crisis'. The most undesireable consequence of this obsession with 
the number of houses built over other considerations, was the indis­
criminate destruction of large swathes of older urban areas, and the 
erection of tower blocks and vast peripheral council estates, many 
of which soon developed new social and environmental problems and 
suffered concomitant stigmatisation. At the same time, the old trad­
itional industries fell into a steep decline, the effects of which, 
in terms of employment, social problems and dereliction, fell dis­
proportionately onto the old central areas of Britain's major cities, 
due to the nature of the urban morphology.
In the housing field the state responded by moving away from 
comprehensive redevelopment, and into the rehabilitation of the existing 
stock, while the problems of economic decline were being expressed 
in spatial terms s
'The government believe that the time has now come to 
give the inner areas an explicit priority in social and 
economic policy.•.'
('Policy for the Inner Cities', Cmnd. 684-5, 1977» P«l)
Ihe consequence of this was a rash of area-based programmes in housing 
(General Improvement Areas, Housing Action Areas), the community 
(Community Development Project, Comprehensive Community Programme), 
the economy (Enterprise Zones, the Docklands Development Agencies) and 
all three (Inner-City Partnerships, Glasgow East Area Renewal).
Coincidental to this re-think of urban policy, was the growing 
dominance of two other trends : the increasing popularity of owner- 
occupation, and the reduction in public spending Owner-occupation has
grown rapidly since the 1920's, and is now the most popular tenure,
( 5 5 . 2% of all households - Nationwide Building Society, I98I). Its 
popularity is undoubtedly related to its generally higher amenity, 
greater freedoms and financial advantages over local authority housing. 
Set against the stigmatisation of much of the council stock, this 
popularity is hardly surprising, yet the Housing Green Paper described 
owner-occupation as 'a basic and natural desire', (DoE 1977 P-50)*
This is clearly clap-trap, tenure choice has much more to do with 
economics than nature, but it illustrates the deep commitment of all 
political parties to support for this tenure form, since to oppose the 
preferred tenure would be to court political disaster. Thus it is, 
that the present government has pushed for the extention of owner- 
occupation and the creation of a 'property owning democracy', both by 
calling for land and planning permissions to be more forthcoming, and 
by the establishment of the 'Right to Buy' council housing, (Tenants 
Rights - etc. (Scotland) Act 1930, The Housing Act I98O). If the 
tenu re is to be extended it must, necessarily, be pushed down-market, 
since higher income groups are almost 100% owner-occupiers. This 
income/tenure relationship may prove to be a crucial limitation to the 
extention of the tenure, (see Table 4-. 3*)«
Hie objective of extending owner-occupation ties neatly into 
policies to reduce public spending and to regenerate the inner-cities. 
The encouragement of private housebuilding, as Chapter Pour illustrated, 
is seen (erroneously) as the main instrument of reducing P.S.B.R.
Indeed, this was also seen as a major economic justification for the 
movement to rehabilitation as opposed to comprehensive redevelopment. 
Quite obviously, rehabilitation can only take place where viable 
structures still exist, but many urban areas still have large areas 
of vacant land, which could be utilised for housebuilding. What is
more, the municipalisation of much of the inner-city housing stock, 
and the retention of much of the rest of it in the declining and un­
popular private renting tenure, has meant that a 'gap* exists in the 
housing market. Good quality owner-occupied housing is a fairly rare 
commodity in the inner-cities, and if the population lost by overspill 
and economic decline is to be attracted back, or at any rate those 
remaining persuaded to stay, then this type of housing must be 
provided.
Of all the cities of the U.K., none have had housing problems 
as severe, none have pursued comprehensive redevelopment with such 
vigour, and none have built as much municipal housing as the City of 
Glasgow. Glasgow attempted to solve its appauling housing conditions 
through the provision of local authority housing, since the passage 
of the 1919 Housing Act, and especially since the Labour Party took 
control of the council in 1933* Until the reorganisation of Scottish 
Local Government in 1975, the council was run by a traditionalist 
Labour Group, who saw housing as an essential social service to be 
provided by the local authority. In such a climate the development 
of housing by the private sector was almost unthinkable, and most of 
the available building land was taken into municipal ownership.
Council housing was provided in two main forms : in Comprehensive 
Development Areas, largely in the fore of high-rise flats ; and in 
the vast peripheral estates, such as Castlemilk, Easterhouse, Drum- 
chapel, Priesthill and Pollock, which largely consisted of three 
storey, walk-up flats. It was the latter that were to provide the 
seedbeds of Glasgow's modern housing problems, and many other social 
deprivations.
Of all Glasgow's problems, it was the loss of population from 
the city, which was the main impetus to changing the District Council's
attitude towards private housebuilding. Reorganisation created a 
new atmosphere in the District, which made the council more receptive 
to innovative ideas. The leader of the Labour Group following re­
organisation, Bailie Dick Dynes, pushed through this major change of 
policy (Hamilton 1978), although it has been perpetuated as much 
through financial necessity following reduced public expenditure, as 
through love for the policy itself. Dynes was following the lead set, 
firstly, by the West Central Scotland Plan (1972), and later by 
Strathclyde Regional Council's Regional Report (1976). With the loss 
of population from the city running at approximately 25,000 p.a., the 
lack of choice in housing was highlighted as a major cause of out­
migration. The restriction of owner-occupation had produced a percentage 
for the city well below the Scottish mean, and further below that for 
the U.K. (see Table 5* 1*)» As a consequence, those wishing to buy 
their own homes had moved to areas beyond the city boundary, such as 
Bishopriggs, Bearsden, Milngavie, and Whitecraigs.
Table 5. 1. Current Tenure Structure - 1980
Area Owner-Occupation Public Rental. Private Rental
U.K. 55.2 31.8 13.0
Scotland 3^.0 5*K 2* 12.7+
Strathclyde Region 30.9 63.2 5.9
Glasgow District 25.6 65.8 8.6
+ Figures apply to 1976
All other figures apply to I98O
(Sources ; Strathclyde Regional Council 1981 b, Nationwide Building 
Society I98I, Glasgow District Council I98O, Scottish 
Office 1977).
The promotion of owner-occupation within Glasgow, it was hoped, 
would stem the flow of migrants, if not attract people hack in. It 
was also hoped, that if new private development could be directed into 
areas of high deprivation, such as G.E.A.R., the Maryhill Corridor 
Project, and the peripheral estates, it would add to their attract­
iveness, improve their social mix , and so, further the objectives of 
deprivation policy, (Strathclyde Regional Council, 1979)*
Before describing the nature of this policy more fully, and 
the response of private housebuilders to it, it is necessary to des­
cribe the peculiarities of the housing market on Clydeside.
5. 3. THE PRIVATE HOUSING MARKET ON CLYDESIDE.
Two administrative impositions have proved to be the dominant 
forces shaping the development of the private housebuilding market in 
Glasgow and its surroundings, and this, in turn, has significantly 
affected the urban morphology. Firstly, the fundamentalist Socialist 
policies of the City of Glasgow led to the municipalisation of the 
vast majority of housing land, a colossal council housebuilding pro­
gramme, and the virtual exclusion of private housebuilders from the 
city, (see Tables 5» 1- and 5* 2.). Secondly, the imposition of a 
Green Belt around the city, following the Second World War, restricted 
private housing development to certain specific sites beyond the city 
boundary. Thus, the area had, and still has, a very much lower per- 
centage of owner-occupied housing than average. In addition to this, 
the private housing which did take place was spatially segregated 
on the periphery of the conurbation. The nature of tenure choice 
dictated that this spatial segregation was reinforced socially, and 
thus, areas such as Bearsden, Milngavie, Bishopriggs, Thomliebank, 
and Newton Mearns, become the leafy havens of the Glaswegian middle- 
class •
Table 5. 2. Private Sector Housing Starts and Completions in 
Glasgow. Strathclyde and Scotland.
Years
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
Glasgow District Strathclyde Region Scotland
Starts Completions Starts Completions Starts Completions
197
164
57
93
77
203
182
57
1972 291
1973 91
1974 119
1975 107
1976 42 6
1977 38 7 530 4,169 4,372 12,631 12,132
1978 586 347 4,975 5,149 16,566 14,443
1979 928 817 - 4,808 15,342 14,960
1980 988 897 3,647 4,250 9,674 12,187
1981
(1st i ) (586) (667) (2,106) (1,918) 5,390 4,808
(Source 1 S.D.D. 1972 - 80f Scottish Housing Statistics 1978 - 82)
This pattern of development forms a contrast to the development 
of other cities in the U.K. While municipal housing development on 
a large scale was common, the extreme spatial and social polarisation 
of housing tenures and classes did not take place to anything 
approaching the same extent. The local, private builders adapted 
themselves to this situation, and became well-practised in the
development process. These firms were not concerned with developing 
a high growth rate, hut with maintaining a stable flow of housing, 
which could be sold lucratively given the high level of demand, and 
the low level of supply prevalent on Clydeside. The companies built 
up large land banks, much of it with planning permission, on which 
considerable gains were made through the land conversion process.
Two companies in particular, John Lawrence and MacTaggart and Mickel, 
developed local monopolies. Lawrence bought over kO% of the private 
housing land in Dumbarton between 1959 “ 72, and the two companies 
together accounted for 35# of housing land in Renfrew. By I98I, they 
still accounted for 17# of all land committed to, or with consents 
for, private housebuilding in the whole of Strathclyde Region, 
(Strathclyde Regional Council 1981 a, Cameron 1981)*
These medium sized local builders, by satisfying themselves 
with supplying the upper end of the market with a reasonably steady 
flow of housing, had effectively left a gap in the market. In a city 
where the percentage of households in the owner-occupied sector is 
only half that of the U.K. as a whole, (Table 5* 1*)» and with an 
income distribution not appreciably different from that of other major 
cities, the scope for expanding the most popular (U.K.) tenure was 
appreciable. It was the volume builders who, having grown from 
strength to strength in England during the Sixties, perceived the 
potential, and began to push into the region, (see Table 5* 3»)*
This increase in activity was met by the three constraints of, 
an unsympathetic council, a strict Green Belt policy, and large land 
banks concentrated in the hands of well established local builders. 
Consequently, the volume builders were forced to either buy-out local 
builders, or move ever further from the centre of the conurbation.
This brought them into conflict with the local builders as their cosy
monopoly was disrupted, and with local planners to release more 
lani for private housebuilding. The latter conflict proved to be 
particularly effective for the volume builders when they secured a 
re-assessment of Strathclyde Regional Council's land supply strategy, 
as a result of pressure exerted on the Secretary of State by the 
Strathclyde Housebuilders Committee, (Strathclyde Regional Council, 
I98I a, Cameron 19Sl)»
Table 5» 3» Ihe Entry of Volume Builders into West Central Scotland.
Builder Year of Entry
Bellway 19^7
Leech Homes (Scotland) 1968
Salvesen (now Weimar Scotland (West) Ltd.) 19^9
Bovis Homes 1973
Barratt (Fhlkirk) Ltd. 1976
Tarmac (MacLeans Homes Ltd.) 1977
Barratt (Glasgow) Ltd. 1979
(Source : Cameron 19&0*
5. 4. THE EVOLUTION AND OPERATION OF THE POLICY.
Following the floating of the proposal to increase the level 
of private sector housebuilding in the West Central Scotland Plan 
(1977), the idea was adopted by Strathclyde Regional Council. Hie 
provision of a wider choice of housing was seen as a desireable end 
in itself, but more importantly, the strategy was '... designed to 
reduce the flow of population and employment from the established 
urban centres.' (Strathclyde Regional Council 1979, P«5)* So far as 
the Regional, strategy to promote employment was concerned, it was felt 
that the '... lack of housing choice mi^it discourage industrial
interests.1 (Strathclyde Regional Council 1979, P*l6). While 'Hie 
reasons for the decline in the conurbation's population have included 
the lack of adequate housing, particularly a shortage of the right 
type of tenure... there is a distinct lack of certain types of owner- 
occupied housing development within the established urban areas, 
particularly Glasgow.' (Strathclyde Regional Council 1979* p«2l).
In accordance with other Regional Strategies, the Council 
expressed a preference for development to take place on 'brownfield'
(or inner-city) sites, although it was recognised that private develop­
ment might also contribute to improving the condition of the stigmatised 
peripheral estates s
'Hie reduction of population density likely to arise in 
certain peripheral housing areas from a positive programme 
of renewal., or as the result of their rejection by tenants, 
will produce spare capacity in infrastructure which could 
be utilised by building on selected adjoining greenfield 
sites.'
(Strathclyde Regional Council 1979, p.22).
Hie development of housing in traditional peripheral sites was to be 
discouraged :
'Continued housebuilding in traditional suburban locations 
.. • would undermine efforts to reduce loss of population. •.
Giving further planning permission for housing in suburban 
locations would divert attention from sites within the 
established built-up areas.'
(Strathclyde Regional Council 1979, p.22).
Thus, the Regional strategy is essentially two-pronged, development 
being restricted in the traditional suburban areas, and land released 
in the inner-city and on greenfield sites next to the peripheral 
council estates.
Glasgow District Council were initially less amenable to the 
ideas mooted in the West Central Scotland Plan and the Strathclyde 
Structure Plan. Their first Housing Plan, (Glasgow District Council 
1978), saw housing progress being made overwhelmingly by the public 
sector. The Plan did state in paragraph 3*18 :
'The Council has agreed that the building of private 
housing should be encouraged in the city.'
(1978 p.20),
but qualified this in paragraph 3*21 :
'Much work needs to be done, however, before the best 
and most equitable means of increasing owner-occupation 
is found.'
The Second Housing Plan (1979) saw the District adopting a more positive 
approach to the extention of owner-occupation, and expressed a desire
to increase the percentage of that tenure from 23.6/6 to the Scottish
average of 3^#« The document went on to state that this could only
be achieved by the release of more land to the private building industry
and through the sale of council housing. In paragraph 2. 5» 6.17*» 
however, this policy statement is contradicted :
"The Council's decision against the sale, or part-sale, of 
council houses has effectively negated the policy objective 
of raising the level of owner-occupation in the city to the 
Scottish average.*
(Glasgow District Council 1979, P«70)*
The Plan indicated that land formerly intended for local authority 
housing had been released with a capacity for 1,400 private houses, 900 
built by private agencies, and 400 built by the Scottish Special Housing 
Association (S.S.H.A.). The S.S.H.A. (1979) in compliance with the 
policy, gave over a third of its new-build programme to build-for-sale
schemes. The S.S.H.A. saw its role as essentially one of 'pump 
priming' in areas where owner-occupation was alien, on the basis 
that if they were successful in selling houses at a commercial price, 
private developers would be encouraged and move into such areas. In 
fact, the S.S.H.A. never started building on some of these sites as 
the District were able to find private builders willing to take on 
their development.
By the time of writing Housing Plan Three (Glasgow District 
Council,I98O), the District had realised the consequences of the 
severe cut-backs made by the new Conservative government, and their 
approach to the private sector became, in consequence, more concilia­
tory. Chapter 8 of the Plan began :
'The Council wishes to co-operate with the private sector 
and to harness its resources to meet the Council's housing 
policy objectives.'
(Glasgow District Council I98O, p.35)*
The District's policies were, by Housing Plan Pour (Glasgow District 
Council, 1981), largely aligned with those of the Region and the 
prime areas for private development were identified as infill sites 
in the inner-city, and greenfield sites adjacent to the peripheral 
estates. Additionally, the District wished to encourage building on 
sites that were not owned by the Council, and offered to use Compulsory 
Purchase powers for land assembly. Housing Plan Three estimated that 
the level of private house construction would not drop below the 1979 
level, up to 1985, giving a total of 4,400 new private houses between 
I98O - 85 (Glasgow District Council, 1980).
The main mechanism used by Glasgow District Council to provide 
land for private builders has been through the preparation of marketing
briefs. The Planning Department, in conjunction with the Housing 
Department, identifies sites and arranges for them to be cleared 
and serviced. The briefs are then compiled, and describe the nature 
of the site, its size, its relation to other areas and the type of 
development envisaged. They are then distributed to developers in 
the area and interested parties enter into negotiation with the 
Estates Department to purchase the sites. Where the Estates Depart­
ment is faced with schemes of a similar price from more than one 
developer, the offers are referred back to the Planning Department, 
which will make a choice on the basis of design criteria. Generally, 
about 20 developers are sent briefs, but most sites only generate one 
or two replies, the most popular might stimulate a half-dozen. Before 
this system became fully developed the District compiled four 'Yellow 
Books'. These consisted of lists of possible sites, and developers 
were informed that the listing of the sites implied planning permission 
for private builders. Some difficulties were experienced with the 
Yellow Books, not least because some of the information was inaccurate 
and developers objected paying the price of £50 per book. Hie 
marketing procedure is now the dominant method of encouraging the 
private sector. By January 1982, 35 sites had been marketed success­
fully, covering an area of about 80.69 hectares, 5 sites covering 7.2 
hectares had been marketed and failed to achieve a satisfactory 
response. A further 21 sites covering 46.1 hectares were in the pro­
cess of being marketed at that time. Table 5* 4. gives a breakdown 
of these sites by the developers who purchased them, and by whether 
they were located in the inner-city or not. It is hoped that this 
will afford some insight into the behaviour of different developers 
and the degree of the success of the policy.
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So far thirteen developers have purchased sites from Glasgow 
District Council, and will produce almost 3»000 houses for owner- 
occupation. On the face of it, this would suggest a modicum of 
success for the policy. If the figures are examined more closely, 
however, (Table 5* ^*)» it will be noted that only a third of the 
sites have been built in the inner-city. What is more, the figures 
in Table 5* do not include sites adjacent to the peripheral estates 
which are, for the most part, among the 21 sites presently being 
marketed. This would suggest that the hoped-for concentration of 
building on brownfield sites has not been entirely successful, and 
this is backed up by the fact that the five sites which were unsuc­
cessful in the marketing process were located in the inner-city.
Part of the reason for this lies with the developers percep­
tion of such sites.^ While most developers believe that there is a 
market for inner-city owner-occupied housing in Glasgow, it is felt 
that sites must be chosen carefully for reasons of commercial viability. 
Developers are at pains to create the impression in their housing 
estates that sites are spatially and socially separated from surroun­
ding non owner-occupied housing. The builders feel that people 
entering the private sector are looking for a 6tyle of housing which 
is distinct from public housing, and that this distinction must, there­
fore, be obvious, especially in stigmatised areas, such as G.E.A.R.
As brownfield sites are generally smaller than greenfield sites, (by
Information concerning the perception of developers and their 
relationships with the local councils are largely drawn from inter­
views conducted with representatives of 5 developers i  Barratt 
(Glasgow), Leech (ihlkirk), Weimar (Scotland West), Wimpey Homes 
(Scotland) and MacTaggart and Mickel, and with officers of Glasgow 
District Council and Strathclyde Regional Council.
about 60% according to Table 5* *^ )> this ’atmosphere' is more 
difficult to create.
The limited size of such sites will also make construction 
nDre expensive, since economies of scale can be achieved with both 
labour and capital on large sites. Site size difficulties are further 
exacerbated by the stipulation of i f  parking spaces per housing unit, 
inposed by the Regional Roads Department. Developers feel that this 
is excessive given the greater likelihood of using public transport 
in the inner-cities. The inclusion of landscaping as a condition of 
planning permission on all kinds of sites, also diminished the amount 
of land on which builders can actually construct houses. Both pro­
visions, by lowering the density of the development, may increase the 
final cost of the house to the consumer. Many inner-city sites are 
unsuitable in Glasgow, because old mineral workings have made the 
ground unstable. Some developers have complained that they have 
wasted resources drawing up plans for sites, only to discover their 
unsuitability. Tie marketing of sites before establishing the suit­
ability of ground conditions is an undesireable, and counter-productive 
practice, since the stature of the District is lessened in the eyes 
of the developers. The cost of many inner-city sites has been low, 
and in some cases zero. Tiis does not constitute a subsidy to the 
developers, however, since inner-city housing commands a lower price, 
while costs of clearance and land preparation are higher than on 
greenfield sites. This is also reflected in the generally higher den­
sity (Table 5« ^«)» and smaller size of inner-city housing units.
The partial success of the policy in directing development to 
brownfield sites, reflects a general lank of understanding by planners 
and other policy makers of the economics of private housebuilding.
Developers will not build on inner-city sites (or any other sites), 
unless they are confident that houses can by sold at a reasonable 
profit. This means that policies designed to attract developers into 
particular areas must aim to create the conditions for this to occur. 
Planning powers are essentially negative, land can be released in 
certain areas to enable development to take plane, but private com­
panies cannot be forced to invest. The importance of the carrot over 
that of the stick seems to have been, to a certain extent, lost on the 
District and Regional Councils. This was illustrated in the general 
attitude of both Councils towards the attempt by the Strathclyde 
Housebuilders Committee to press the Secretary of State for the release 
of more land than that initially proposed in the Written Statement of 
the Strathclyde Structure Plan, (Strathclyde Regional Council, 1979)* 
Thus, in Housing Plan Four the District states :
'... any premature release of large greenfield sites in 
the Region could seriously jeopardise the future success 
of the Council's urban renewal policy, by diverting the 
interest of private housing developers elsewhere.'
(Glasgow District Council 1981* paragraph 7.18).
Indeed, this view has led officers of Strathclyde Regional Council to 
speculate that the policy would have already been undermined, had it 
not been for the large land banks held by the local builders.
There is some truth in this assertion, as the more successful 
performance of the greenfield sites marketed by the District illustrates, 
but developers do believe that there is a distinct market for inner- 
city development, which means that they would develop in brownfield 
areas whether greenfield sites were released or not. It is difficult 
to tell how far this claim is a ploy to reassure planners to release
more suburban sites, but the characteristics of the inner-city 
housing market do appear to be somewhat different from the suburban 
market, houses here tending to be smaller and cheaper (Scottish 
Economic Planning Department, 1978)* What is more, the demand for 
housing is presently growing at the bottom end of the. market, since 
the prevailing economic conditions have made the second-hand market 
very sluggish. Consequently, first-time buyers provide the only 
buoyant section of the market, and can easily acquire Building Society 
finance, (assuming they can afford to pay the interest charges) since 
funds are not being used in the second-hand market. There is also 
a slight, but perceptable, trend back to the cities associated with 
rising commuting costs. Despite these current trends, the risks are 
still higher in the inner-city, because the market is not so familiar, 
and the profit margins are probably lower. Given these qualifications, 
the greatest scope for pushing builders into the inner-cities must be 
among those builders who lack any large suburban land banks, and who 
must maintain a high rate of growth. Thus it is, that the volume 
builders have come to dominate the marketed sites (Table 5* ) and
that the company with the highest growth rate, Barratt (Glasgow), has 
come to account for k6% of houses built on the marketed inner-city 
sites.
The strategy might be more successful if larger sites in inner- 
city areas could be made available to private housebuilders. Barratts 
certainly believe this, and have been pushing the District to sell 
them vast areas of land in the East End of Glasgow and at the peripheral 
estates. These sites are so large that the District has so far, proved 
somewhat wary of the idea, but the advantage of larger sites in 
creating distinct neighbourhoods is great, and this concern is central
to the developers' concept of marketability. This is not to say 
that planners have not attempted to understand and accomodate the 
economic imperatives of private housebuilding. Strathclyde Region 
have initiated an exercise similar to that of the Manchester Study of 
Residential Land Availability, (DoE 1979)» in its 'Schedule of Resi­
dential Infill Sites' (Strathclyde Regional Council 1981 d). Nonetheless 
it is likely that there is a limit beyond which developers cannot be 
pushed into the inner-city, which neither the District nor the Region 
may fully comprehend.
Other aspects of the interactions between private housebuilders 
and the local bureaucracies make for strained relations. Tie most 
celebrated and long-running dispute is that over the rate of land 
release. In Strathclyde Region this has led to the Secretary of State 
under pressure from the Strathclyde Housebuilders Committee, to force 
an ammendment of the Structure Plan, to include greater provision for 
the release of greenfield sites in the event of demand outstripping 
that predicted by the Region, (Strathclyde Regional Council 1981 a).
This places the Structure Plan in the contradictory position of 
stating that further greenfield release is undesireable, and then, 
preceding to list those areas where it might be considered. This 
reluctance is not only borne out of a concern for brownfield develop­
ment, it is also felt that if more land is released, beyond the 
prevailing activities of the building industry, that those companies 
which do not have land banks will begin to build them up. The builders 
also complain that by restricting the supply of land, its price is 
forced up. This seems unlikely since firstly, as the developers then*- 
selves claim, the price of land is derived from the price of housing 
determined by demand, and secondly, the supply of land already outstrips
demand, (Strathclyde Regional Council, I98I b). Tie price of land 
might be forced up, however, on particularly desireable sites.
Another bone of contention is to be found in the delays 
created by the planning process. Many firms claim that they need a 
three year land bank in order to ensure enough land is in the 'devel­
opment pipeline' for building to be maintained. This has proved to 
be an exaggerated claim in other areas,(JURUE 1977)* So far as the 
marketed sites in Glasgow are concerned, the average time lapse 
between the appointment of a developer by the Planning Committee, to 
the start of building is 16J- months, (the range being from k to 28 
months). Additional delays are experienced after building has started, 
however, if the builder feels that the market has changed and he wishes 
to build a different style, or size, of house from that originally 
envisaged. Even so, only two of the marketed sites took longer than 
three years to reach completion (of the eleven that have), and most 
were completed in around two years from their appointment.
Nonetheless, long delays are often caused by planners attempting 
to insist on a certain style, or density, which the developer believes 
is not viable, or in his best interest. In Glasgow, for example, 
planners have attempted to pursuade developers to continue the lines 
of existing tenement facades. But this conflicts directly with the 
developer's commercial necessity of differentiating his development 
from its adjacent areas. On at least two occasions, this has led 
developers to withdraw from the development of inner-city sites, and 
in others it has led to delays. This situation reflects the planner's 
dual role, as the promoter of owner-occupation, and as a protector of 
the environment through density and design criteria. A central problem 
with questions of design is that such considerations are inevitably
subjective. Developers will argue that the consumer dictates 
questions of design through the market mechanism. While planners 
can point to the highly imperfect nature of the housing market, to 
argue that consumer sovereignty does not exist, since there is only 
a limited supply of alternative dwellings to the consumer at any one 
time - the best of the bunch does not constitute an ideal style.
What is more, the appearance of a building will exert significant 
externalities on those who do not occupy it, and the planner has a 
responsibility to them. This is not the place to assess the extent 
to which it is acceptable for planners to adopt the role of 'guardian 
of public taste,' suffice it to say that such considerations can 
delay development, and so increase the cost of the final product, as 
developers are forced to incur additional interest charges on money 
borrowed to purchase the site.
Tie type of housing built in Glasgow in the creation of these 
'separate' neighbourhoods, has varied with the developers. Generally, 
in the inner-city sites the housing units are in the form of flats, 
not in the Scottish tenement style, but in small two or three storey 
blocks, resembling large detached houses. Tie inner-city sites are 
built at a consistently higher density (Table 5« ^*)» tut the green­
field sites are now also being built at higher densities, and often 
in flat form, whereas formerly detached and semi-detached houses 
would have been built. This reflects a movement by the builders down­
market, often because of the lower purchasing power of first-time 
buyers, as compared to a few years ago. Green-field sites do still 
have a fair amount of this low density housing, estates tend to be a 
mixture of house sizes, which is not found on brownfield sites. Many 
builders have attempted to stimulate the lower end of the market by
offering inducements, such as 95% (or even 100%) mortgages, free 
legal fees, and various discounts. Barratt have undoubtedly been 
the most ruthless in their marketing, and most productive in their 
activities, having developed 11 of the 35 marketed sites. Each com­
pany is distinguished by different characteristics. For example, 
among the volume builders, Leech and Wimpey have stayed largely on 
greenfield sites, while Barratt and Weimar have built in both the 
inner-city and at the periphery, and Bovis only in the inner-city. 
Weimar's inner-city development stands out in that they are not building 
flats, but very small houses with gardens. The volume builders will 
develop 2,20^ houses (7^*8%) of the 2,9^5 to be built on the marketed 
sites. This compares with an average for Glasgow in 1978/9 of 81.7% 
of all houses, and 60.6% of houses in Strathclyde. Tie turnover of 
the volume builders is appreciably faster than that of other builders.
Of the eleven completed sites, 10 have been built by the volume builders, 
half of them by Barratt. This reflects their economic necessity to 
constantly expand the number of houses they sell. Of the more estab­
lished local builders, Lawrence has developed three of the marketed 
sites, two in inner-city areas. Tieir activities are generally more 
low-key, and their marketing techniques less sensational. Not sur­
prisingly, most of the traditional builders' activities still take 
place in the traditional suburban areas.
5. 5. CONCLUSIONS.
It is somewhat difficult to draw definite conclusions about 
the success, or otherwise, of the policy of promoting new private 
housebuilding in the City of Glasgow. Certainly, the release of sites 
by the District Council has led to the development of 35 of them, and 
the possibility of another 20. How far this is contributing to the
regeneration of the inner-city, is open to more doubt. Two-thirds 
of the sites marketed by the District are outside the inner-city, 
many on desireable greenfield sites. If the policy is to be more 
successful in this respect, it seems that larger inner-city sites, 
and sites adjacent to the peripheral estates, must be made available, 
and developers must be pursuaded to develop them if the polarised 
residential pattern is to be broken down. So far as increasing the 
tenure choice is concerned, the policy is likely to have only a min­
imal effect. The projected new-build rate for owner-occupation in 
the District up to 1987 is 1091 p.a., yet it is estimated that the 
percentage of the housing stock in owner-occupation will only increase 
from 25*6% in I98O to 27*4% in 1987* and this figure presumably 
includes an estimate of the level of council house sales, (Strathclyde 
Regional Council I98I c). If the level of owner-occupied housing is 
to approach the Scottish average, much more drastic policies would 
have to be adopted, which could have far-reaching effects on the level 
of vacancies in the public sector. The possible policy alternatives 
at both the national and the local level form the basis for the final 
chapter.
CHAPTER SIX
SOME CONCLUSIONS AND POSSIBIE FUTURE DIRECTIONS.
6. l.
This concluding chapter attempts to draw together the 
important elements of the relationship between policy and the house 
construction industry highlighted in those preceding. In so doing, 
some comment will be made with regard to the rationale behind, and 
the performance of, prevailing policies. Both national and local 
housing policies will be discussed and particular emphasis will be 
placed on the promotion of owner-occupation in the City of Glasgow. 
Tentative suggestions will be forwarded as to how these policies might 
be improved, or abandoned in favour of new policies, to obtain a more 
desireable response from housebuilders. These suggestions are essen­
tially reformist and gradualist, since the radical programmes of the 
political left and right would require far-reaching changes throughout 
the national economy, the description of which is beyond the scope of 
this dissertation.
6. 2. NATIONAL HOUSING POLICY.
At the present time, national housing policy is essentially 
contradictory. The overwhelming concern of the present government is 
to use the level of public expenditure on housing as a major tool of 
macro-economic policy. As such, by reducing the H.S.G., and controlling 
local expenditure through H.E.L., it is hoped that the P.S.B.R. will 
be reduced, and so inflation will fall. This has led to the bulk of 
money spent on housing by local authorities to be devoted to current, 
rather than capital expenditure. The effect on the house construction 
industry has been highly depressive, and monetarist policies have 
created difficulties in the private sector as well, by pushing up 
interest rates. Consequently, the number of houses started has plum­
meted, and the amount of unemployment and under-utilised capacity in
the industry has grown. This movement away from capital expenditure 
in the public sector has been accentuated by H.E.L., which has penal­
ised local authorities, who do not raise council rents by the level 
advised by the Secretary of State, by the imposition of an equivalent 
reduction in their capital allocation.
This policy is contradictory for two reasons. Firstly, much 
of the apparant savings made by increasing council house rents are 
illusory, since the cost is passed on to other government accounts, 
such as rent allowances and Supplementary Benefit payments. Secondly, 
the government has stated that in the absence of local authority 
investment, the new housing required by society will be built by the 
private sector. Yet, the owner-occupied sector carries overall, and 
per household, a larger subsidy bill in the form of tax relief on 
mortgage repayments. Thus, inducements to owner-occupation in the 
form of additional land release to speculative housebuilders, and 
through the sale of council housing will undoubtedly increase public 
expenditure, yet this subsidy is not recognised as such a subsidy in 
the Public Expenditure White Paper (Cmnd. 8175 )• Local authorities 
are allowed to use the money gained from the sale of council housing 
to finance new-build. But, since twelve council houses have to be 
sold to construct one new one, the rate of sales would have to be 
phenomenal for the new-build programme deemed necessary by the Green 
Paper of 1977 (DoS) to be achieved.
The housing finance system is further biased against capital 
expenditure by the nature of the subsidy to owner-occupiers. Mortgage 
interest tax relief is such that any mortgagor is entitled to relief, 
whether or not the house is a new one. In I98O, only 1^ % of houses 
subsidised in this way were new, (Shelter (Scotland), 1981).
Furthermore, the mortgage tax relief subsidy is regressive and has 
encouraged over-consumption, since the higher the rate of taxation 
paid by the mortgagor, and the more expensive the house, (up to the 
mortgage limit of £25,000), then the larger the subsidy. Over­
consumption is further encouraged in the better-off, since housing 
is exempt from Capital Gains Tax and Capital Transfer Tax. Thus, in 
both the public and the private sectors consumption is being subsi­
dised at the expense of investment, and consequently, the primary 
task of replacing the existing housing stock has become subservient 
to improving the housing conditions of those already well housed. 
Indeed, it is theoretically possible for the whole of the subsidy to 
the owner-occupied sector to be totally unrelated to new investment. 
This must be set against a current rate of replacement of the housing 
stock of 0.3%, which effectively means that each house is expected to 
last 350 years, (Shelter (Scotland), 19&1)* Thus, while subsidies 
increased throughout the 1970s, investment did not increase at all, 
(McIntosh, 1982).
There would appear to be little that can be done to avoid 
these problems without reforming the housing finance system and 
increasing public expenditure. The public sector appears to offer 
fewer obstacles to reform than the private sector. The basic thinking 
behind the H.I.P. and Housing Plan systems, that resources should be 
directed towards those areas of greatest need, is basically sound.
But, that overall amount of public expenditure devoted to housebuilding 
is too small, if an adequate rate of replacing the housing stock is 
to be achieved, given that the private housebuilder is heavily con­
strained by the availability of mortgage finance. Furthermore, if the 
rate of capital expenditure could be held reasonably constant, this
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would go some way towards ironing out the damaging cyclical character 
of the construction industry, increasing the security of both 
employers and employees, and creating conditions more conducive to 
innovation in improving productivity. Additionally, loans to local 
authorities could be index-linked to avoid the 'front loading' pheno­
menon. Thus, the long-term advantage of borrowing rates, which are 
negative in real terms, would be sacrificed in return for accepting 
short-term costs. Such a scheme has been introduced in the Netherlands 
where it was also extended to private landlords. The 'trade off' of 
capital and current expenditure could be overcome by separating the 
capital and revenue budgets, so that central government could allocate 
directly to each. So that the subsidy to council tenants could be 
made more just, rents everywhere should rise with inflation and the 
vast disparity in rent levels between different authorities could be 
brought gradually into line. Those authorities with greater housing 
stress could be safeguarded by a system of national rent pooling,
(Kilroy 1973, McIntosh 1982).
The essential elements in reforming the subsidisation of owner- 
occupied housing are that s the level of public expenditure should be 
of a type that the government can control; its distributional effect 
should be progressive, rather than regressive; it should not give a 
greater subsidy to households because they are in a particular tenure; 
and it should not subsidise consumption over production. The impli­
cations of this are that owner-occupiers as a whole, and especially 
better-off owner-occupiers would have to receive lower subsidies, 
since that sector receives preferential treatment. This would release 
resources either to finance higher expenditure in the public sector, 
or to give extra subsidies to low income owner-occupiers. Indeed, the 
devotion of more resources to the public sector might be regarded as
progressively redistributive per se, since there is a concentration 
of lower income groups in that sector.
One method to reduce expenditure and limit the benefit to i
higher income groups would be to introduce a universal Option Mortgage 
Subsidy. This would limit the tax relief subsidy to those paying 
the standard rate of income tax, while payment direct from the 
Exchequer to lending institutions would bring the Subsidy into the 
Public Expenditure White Paper, and save the Inland Revenue adminis­
trative costs. The tax relief ceiling of £25,000 could be reduced 
in addition to this. In real terms this is already happening, since 
the ceiling has not been raised for a number of year’s, and so the sub­
sidy has been eroded by inflation. So far, this has had a minimal 
effect, since in I98O only 9% of mortgages were over £20,000, but by 
1983/^ as many as 25% of mortgages may be over £25,000. If the ceiling 
was to be reduced to £20,000 in that year, 35% of mortgages would be 
above it leading to a saving of £15 M p.a. This would have the addi­
tional desireable effect of depressing house prices at the top end of 
the market, and would encourage the purchase of smaller houses, so 
lessening the prevalent over-consumption by higher income groups. A 
disadvantage is that such a ceiling is insensitive to regional variations 
in house prices, (Shelter (Scotland), 1981). Alternatively, the rate 
at which tax relief is given may be reduced, either to below the stan­
dard rate, or by making it applicable to only a proportion of the 
mortgage, perhaps 5^%. This would give the government greater control 
over expenditure, since the percentage could be altered.
Another possible reform would be the introduction of a Single 
Annuity Relief System. This would counter the advantage which people 
enjoy by 'trading up', enabling them to revert to the most favourable
levels of assistance on new mortgages. It could be achieved by- 
allowing tax relief on a second or subsequent mortgage, only on the 
notional interest which would be due if a twenty-five year mortgage 
for the new amount had been taken out at the date of the original 
mortgage. The entitlement to relief would end after twenty-five 
years. This * one household, one mortgage * principle would reduce the 
incentive to * trade up1, and so would reduce house price inflation.
A final option in the owner-occupied sector is to re introduce 
a tax on the imputed rental income accruing to owner-occupiers,
(Schedule A Tax), and the introduction of Capital Gains Tax for housing. 
The re introduction of Schedule A Tax: is theoretically easy to justify 
since mortgage interest tax relief was introduced as a compensation 
for this tax, and indeed, its maintenance is somewhat difficult to 
justify since the abolition of Schedule A Tax in 1963. Politically, 
however, its introduction would be more difficult to achieve. It 
does have the great attraction of being able to raise exceptionally 
large sums of money. It has been estimated that £8,600M could be 
collected in this way - enough to abolish the domestic rate and be 
left with money to protect low income home owners, (McIntosh, 1982).
]
This high tax would have to be offset by tax relief of some kind to 
make it acceptable. The non-payment of Capital Gains Tax on housing 
constitutes a subsidy to the better-off, and encourages over-consumption 
and house price inflation, and as such it should be collected.
A more comprehensive reform which could be applied to both the 
public and private sectors would be the introduction of a housing 
allowance, on a similar basis to that of the family allowance. Such 
an allowance could be universal or means-tested, although means-tested 
benefits generally have a low take-up rate, high administrative costs
and might create a 'poverty trap'. For this reason the Supplementary 
Benefits Commission favoured the introduction of such a universal 
allowance to replace the existing housing subsidy system. It could 
be paid at a flat rate, with additions for every dependent child, 
elderly and disabled person. The allowance might replace all existing 
aid, and would have a variable element to take account of areas where 
housing costs are higher. The allowance would be progressive if it 
was subject to taxation, and therefore, open to ' claw-back'. The gen­
eral effect would be to make better-off owner-occupiers worse off, and 
low income owner-occupiers better-off. Tenants would have to pay 
higher rents, but would receive an allowance corresponding to their 
needs, (Lansley, 1976).
Obviously, such reforms could be introduced in a number of 
possible permutations. For example, the housing allowance scheme 
could be financed through a combination of revenue from tax on imputed 
rent on owner-occupiers, and the introduction of Capital Gains Tax.
There seems little doubt that such reforms are necessary, if there is 
to be greater equality between the subsidies given to households in 
different tenure types. It is also essential that the preferential 
taxation treatment of owner-occupation above other forms of investment 
is ended, as this has drawn increasing amounts of capital into non­
productive housing and land investments, and away from production in 
all sectors of the economy, including house production. By removing 
financial incentives to 'trade-up', and the over-consumption of housing, 
better use will be made of existing resources as smaller units will be 
built. While the depression of house prices at the upper end of the 
market will encourage build ere to build for the lower end. Such changes 
must be introduced gradually, however, since a radical disruption of 
the pattern of demand may 'catch out* many speculative builders and
lead to financial difficulties. While a quick reduction in the 
subsidy given to owner-occupiers may depress house prices, and so 
put the industry into a slump deeper than that currently being 
experienced, while undermining the investments made by many house­
holds. If no reforms are forthcoming, however, the system will become 
increasingly unequal, irrational and wasteful.
Furthermore, such policy changes cannot be initiated without 
a full consideration of the housebuilding industry's ability to 
respond to them. If, for example, policies such as those described 
did result in a depression of the upper end of the market, and led 
to smaller housing units becoming more popular, the initial reaction 
in the market would probably be an increase in the price of smaller 
houses. The building industry takes some time to respond to changes 
in the pattern of demand, due to its cautious nature and lengthy pro­
duction process, and it might be doubly cautious in the uncertainty 
surrounding new policy initiatives. The raising of smaller house 
prices could in no way be seen as desireable, since it is those with 
low incomes and first time buyers who, due to their poor competitive 
position, are concentrated in this section of the market. Consequently, 
changes in demand precipitated by those, or other policies, must be 
initiated carefully and the building process lubricated if possible.
In anticipation of such changes, it might be possible to give priority 
to planning application from builders wishing to construct for the 
growing sector of the market. Or, central government could set up a 
system of housing certificates, similar to those issued following the 
Second World War, which would limit the resources that could be 
devoted to the upper end of the market. A gradual change would give 
the industry more time to respond, while the provision of detailed
information to the industry about the anticipated market behaviour, 
might increase developers' confidence. If it appears that the private 
sector would not be able to respond, and shortages are anticipated, 
the public sector could step in with *build-for-sale' projects. Such 
careful management of the housing market has not yet been attempted 
in this country, but if it could be achieved, the benefits might prove 
to be substantial.
Such reforms as these would enable scarce resources to be used 
more efficiently, but even the most efficient use of resources will 
not solve Britain's current housing problems. If the existing housing 
stock is to be replaced at a realistic rate, substantial investment 
is required, and if that investment is not forthcoming soon, the degen­
eration of the housing stock will be catastrophic. The current rate 
of new build is exceptionally low, and at the same time the housing 
stock is falling into disrepair at an ever-increasing rate. Meanwhile, 
the number of people living in over-crowded conditions and lacking 
basic aminities is showing signs of stabilising, while houshold form­
ation is increasing. To put off necessary investment now will simply 
lead to greater pressure on our resources in the future.
6. 3. LOCAL HOUSING POLICY.
Given the nature of central government policy, local policy­
makers have necessarily lost autonomy to the national administration. 
The tight grip central government has taken of public expenditure in 
housing, has meant that public sector initiatives have been severely 
curtailed. Yet, the same systems which introduced these tighter 
financial, controls,the H.I.P. and Housing Plan systems, also imposed 
a responsibility on local government to consider local needs in all 
tenures.
The inability to achieve much through public capital, expen­
diture, has led to an increasing reliance on the private sector to 
fulfil local housing needs. This may make the achievement of policy 
objectives more difficult since , by its very nature, the private 
sector is not subject to comprehensive governmental control. Thus, 
local authorities must offer carrots, and wave sticks in an attempt 
to move that intransigent donkey, the private housebuilder. The one 
resource essential to developers, over which local authorities can 
exercise control, is land. The planning system is such that the 
release of land by the granting of planning permission can be used to 
restrict development in certain locations, and encourage it in others. 
Thus, in Glasgow, and indeed in other cities (Nicholls et al. 1980), 
this instrument has been used in order to restrict housing development 
on desireable greenfield sites, and so push developers into less 
desireable inner-city sites and adjacent to problematic peripheral 
council estates.
In Glasgow District the three main objectives being pursued 
in this way are the reduction, if not reversal, of outmigration, the 
regeneration of socially and environmentally deprived areas, and the 
widening of tenure choice per se. These problems, while extreme in 
Glasgow, are familiar to many other British cities. Some measure of 
success seems likely to be achieved in the first two objectives in 
Glasgow, but the latter would seem to depend more on the sale of 
council housing in the short-to medium-term, than on new build.
Apart from land release, other forms of inducement can be used. 
The simple provision of information about the availability, ownership 
and characteristics of available sites is important, as it lets 
developers know what the possibilities for development are. Both
Glasgow District and Strathclyde Region have utilised this form of 
incentive. Where the District owns land, the process of development 
is made easier, since the developer is likely to gain planning per­
mission where the land is sold to him for that express purpose. The 
provision of land and information are essentially 'enabling' methods.
Such local policies will be more successful the deeper is the 
local policy-makers' understanding of the exigencies of private housing 
development. To be marketable, sites in areas not traditionally known 
for owner-occupation must be made distinct from their surroundings.
The larger the site, the easier this will be to accomplish. So far, 
Glasgow District have been somewhat reticent to release very large 
inner-city sites, but if they were to do so, their policy objectives 
might be achieved more quickly. One fear is that if a large amount 
of land is released, developers may build up land banks. It is those 
firms which do not have large land banks that are most likely to 
respond to attempts to obtain development on less desireable sites. 
Consequently, the build up of land banks must be discouraged, and 
therefore, the restricted release of greenfield sites should continue.
So far, the methods used by Glasgow District have been fairly 
straight-forward, consisting of the sale of sites to developers on 
the basis of marketing briefs. On some sites the incorporation of 
'special needs' housing has been 'bartered'as part of the price of 
the site. This practice offers a good basis for future initiatives, 
and the development of other types of council housing, and social 
facilities might accompany future developments. Indeed, it might be 
possible to engage in full, 'joint venture' schemes with developers 
containing both council and private housing as part of a general 
regeneration package for an area, assuming the local authority can
raise the capital. Additionally, in exchange for land, (possibly 
at a subsidy), the developer might agree to sell to buyers nominated 
from the council house waiting list. A variation on the theme of 
marketing sites, the local authority could offer sites at a fixed 
price, and then hold a design competition so as to achieve higher 
quality developments. To maintain greater control over the eventual 
purchasers of housing, the council could retain the freehold of sites 
and commission developers to develop the sites. The retention of the 
freehold enables the authority to choose the eventual purchaser, 
since they can pass it onto certain people, for example, those on 
the council house waiting list, or first time buyers, while the 
developer will receive the sale price. Finally, the local authority 
could use Compulsory Purchase powers to consolidate land, and so 
provide suitably sized sites to developers, possibly at a subsidy 
in order to keep house prices low.
6. 4.
At both the national and local policy-making levels, there 
needs to be a more coherent and rational response to housing problems. 
Policies must be formulated with regard to the capacity and economic 
necessities of the house construction industry, and the characteristics 
of the housing market, if policy objectives are to be achieved. There 
are many ways in which all kinds of housing policies might be improved 
and it is to be hoped that the foresight and political will exists to 
see such policies implemented.
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